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左翼はなぜ力を失ったのか すがるのは「民主主義」、保守に対抗できる価値観が欠落 2014.10.06（月） 筆坂 秀世
日本から革新勢力をなくしたソ連崩壊
ソビエト連邦が崩壊したとき、「これで保守と革新の対決は消滅した」という議論が多くなされた。これに対して日本共産党は、この『保革対決消滅』論は、真の革新政党である共産党の存在意義を無視しようとする攻撃であり、そんなことは断じてない、と主張した。もう二十数年前の話である。

　だがそれから数年経った時、共産党の文書から「革新」という言葉は消えていた。現在でも使われているのは、「革新自治体」というときだけである。ソ連崩壊以前は、日本社会党（現在の社民党）と共産党の間でどちらが「革新の本家」か、革新の本家争いをしていたものである。「革新3目標」とか、「政治革新」とか、日本共産党の文書には「革新」という言葉が躍っていた。いわば党の存在意義を象徴する言葉であった。

　ところが1994年、村山富市社会党委員長を首班とする「自社さ」連立政権が誕生した。保革対決どころか、社会党は保守陣営に飲み込まれてしまった。

　米ソ冷戦体制の終結は、その日本版であった保革対決の構造をも消滅させてしまった。そして、共産党の文書からも「革新」の言葉が消えてしまったのである。

保革対決は資本主義と社会主義の対決だった

　共産党は「我こそが日本の革新勢力の代表だ」と言ってきたが、実はそれは社会党に向かって言っていたのだ。だから社会党が消滅すると「革新」という言葉を振り上げる場がなくなってしまった。それはそうで、自民党に向かって言ってみても仕方がないフレーズだ。

　これは当然の帰結だったと言える。日本における保守と革新の対決とは、資本主義と社会主義の対決であった。だがソ連や東欧の社会主義陣営の崩壊は、社会主義の敗北を世界中の人々の前で鮮やかに立証した。

　共産党は、「ソ連の体制は、本当の社会主義ではなかった。社会主義はもっと良い社会なのだ」と盛んに主張した。今もそうだ。だがソ連が崩壊して20年以上が経過したが、社会主義への道をまったく示せないのが共産党の現状である。

　共産党綱領には、「社会主義・共産主義の社会をめざして」という章がある。「発達した資本主義の国での社会主義・共産主義への前進をめざす取り組みは、二十一世紀の新しい世界史的な課題である」というだけである。「前進をめざす取り組み」が21世紀の課題だとすれば、実現する世紀は22世紀以降のことなのか。

　これでは、社会主義革命に命を懸けようなどと若者に呼びかけることなどできない。

憲法制定時は第9条に反対していた

　周知のように共産党は、現憲法制定時、これに反対した。共産党の得意の言い方をするなら、「占領時、アメリカによって作られた現憲法に勇気をもって反対した唯一の政党です」ということになる。

　最近、共産党は「憲法第9条は世界の宝」などと言っているが、その第9条に反対したのが共産党であった。

　今になって、「9条に反対したのは、当時の吉田首相が自衛権すら日本は持たない、と答弁したからだ。その後、自衛権は持っていると改めたので第9条への評価を変えた」と弁明している。これは真っ赤なウソである。1970年代に党大会で決定した「民主連合政府綱領提案」でも、80年代にまとめた政策集でも、憲法第9条の改正を明記している。

　憲法第9条は、アメリカが平和主義の立場で書き込んだものではない。厄介な日本を丸腰にし、軍事的空白は在日米軍が埋めるという構想からである。共産党にとって、「独立」というスローガンも重要な政策提言であった。日米安保条約を廃棄して在日米軍をすべて撤退させると同時に、憲法第9条を改正し、自前の軍事力を持つことを提起していたのだ。

　「第9条は世界の宝」などという軽薄なスローガンは、独立の気概を失ってしまった共産党からしか生まれてこないものである。

共産党が現憲法を擁護するのは自殺行為

　個人の自由、民主主義、幸福追求権、平和主義などの憲法的価値も、共産党は無条件に賛美している。だがこれらの価値は、資本主義の生み出した価値である。そのうえ、どれ1つを取っても危うい価値観である。個人の自由や幸福追求権は弱肉強食の論理につながる。軍隊を持たない平和主義は、国や国民を守る意識を薄弱にする。

　なかでも難しいのが民主主義である。

　この10年の日本の政治を振り返ってみても、小泉純一郎・田中真紀子ブームがあった。「自民党をぶっ壊す」という小泉氏の絶叫に多くの国民が狂喜乱舞した。だが小泉氏があれだけの民意に支えられても自民党は壊れなかった。

　数年前には、「政権交代」という四文字によって、国民は民主党に投票し、政権交代が実現した。だが民主党が失敗するとその反動で自民党安倍政権が誕生し、集団的自衛権行使容認の憲法解釈や消費税増税が実現した。この間の評価は、人それぞれであろう。

　だが、はっきり言えるのは、民主主義が自動的に良い政治や良い社会を実現するものではないということだ。これは当然であって、一人ひとりの国民があらゆる問題について正しい判断をすることはできないからだ。

　言いたいことは、進歩を目指す政党なら、一応は革命を唱える政党なら、アメリカから与えられた価値観や資本主義が生み出した価値観を絶対視せず、それを乗り越える価値を生み出す努力をすべきではないかということだ。それなしに、共産党でなければならないという値打ちを発揮することはできないだろう。

民主主義の欠陥の象徴こそ「民主集中制」

　そもそも民主主義がいかに「言うは易し　行うは難し」であるかは、共産党の組織原則である民主集中制を見れば明らかである。

　現在の党規約には、次のように規定されている。

　第三条　党は、党員の自発的な意思によって結ばれた自由な結社であり、民主集中制を組織の原則とする。その基本は、つぎのとおりである。

（一） 党の意思決定は、民主的な議論をつくし、最終的には多数決で決める。
（二） 決定されたことは、みんなでその実行にあたる。行動の統一は、国民にたいする公党としての責任である。
（三） すべての指導機関は、選挙によってつくられる。
（四） 党内に派閥・分派はつくらない。
（五） 意見がちがうことによって、組織的な排除をおこなってはならない。

　もっともらしい規定である。だが「民主的に議論を尽くす」とはどういうことか。例えば共産党の最高意思決定機関は、党大会である。党大会の2カ月ぐらい前に「党大会決議案」というのが「しんぶん赤旗」紙上に掲載される。最近でも新聞のページ数で5ページとか、6ページという長大なものだ。以前は、もっと長かった。

　この決議案を全党員が読むだけでなく、中身をよく吟味し、それに基づいて議論を尽くすというわけである。

　だが現実はどうなっているか。大会までに議案を読み切ったという党員は、自主申告ですら3割程度だ。大半の党員は読んでいない。これでどうやって「民主的に議論を尽くす」のか。

　その基盤がそもそも出来上がってないのが党の現状である。だから党大会が終わって1年経っても、2年経っても、「党大会決定を読もう」というキャンペーンがなされているのである。

　議論をするというのは、当該問題についてよほど深い知識や吟味がなければできないことである。「しんぶん赤旗」すら読んでいない党員が多数いる現状は、そもそも民主主義が成り立つ基礎的条件が出来上がっていないということでもある。

　「すべての指導機関は、選挙によってつくられる」というのも、まったく正しくない。共産党の組織は基本的には、“秘密結社”である。「私は共産党員です」と公にしているのは、議員や候補者、専従職員だけである。企業や地域や役所、学校などで活動している党員は、共産党員であることを明かしていない。

　しかも、「党内に派閥・分派はつくらない」ために、各支部間など横の連携は禁止されている。大企業に働く労働者や公務員などは、実名とは別の党内用の名前を使っている。

　支部党会議、地区党会議、都道府県党会議、党大会でそれぞれの指導機関が作られる。支部委員、地区委員、党府県委員、中央委員というのがそれである。支部内はほとんどが顔見知りだが、地区党会議などに行くと、名前を聞いてもどこの誰やらさっぱり分からない。顔も分からない。選挙運動も一切ない。これでどうやって選挙をするのか。できるわけがないのだ。

　だから地区党会議では、地区委員会という指導機関が、自分たちで選んだ地区委員候補の名簿を提案する。これは都道府県党会議でも、党大会でも同様だ。「この人にはなってもらいたくない」という人にだけ印をつける。だがほとんど知らない人ばかりだから、印のつけようもない。だから落選者が絶対出ないのが、共産党が言う選挙なのである。

　これが民主主義と言うのなら、民主主義は到底、絶対的な価値ではないということになる。

　そもそも　個人の自由、民主主義、幸福追求権、平和主義などの憲法的価値は、戦後、日本の保守が打ち立ててきた　ものである。これと同じ価値観しか持たない左翼が力を喪失するのは、当然である。

http://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/41890

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2014年05月20日 　　　　カテゴリ：ニュース速報 ..
　片山祐輔（前科持ち）が真犯人メール送信を弁護士に認める！片山被告は現在身柄拘束ｗｗｗ 　※画像/過去・学歴などの経歴・Wikiまとめあり【PC遠隔操作事件】ｍ
いつｋ
コメント133
.※2014/5/20追記

5/16
遠隔操作の真犯人を名乗る「小保方銃蔵」から関係者にメールが届く
http://www.akb48matomemory.com/archives/1003011793.html
メール本文（全文掲載）
http://yokoku.in/enkaku2012/mail20140516.pdf　

↓

5/19
パソコンの遠隔操作事件で、１６日、自分が「真犯人」だとするメールが報道機関などに送られたが、このメールは、現在公判中の片山祐輔被告が自ら送ったとみられることが分かった。
http://www.news24.jp/articles/2014/05/19/07251386.html

パソコンの遠隔操作事件で、被告の元会社員と弁護団は午後２時から会見を行う予定でしたが、被告は現在も会見場に姿を見せておらず、弁護団によりますと連絡が取れなくなっているということです。
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/shutoken-news/20140519/4540623.html

「真犯人」を名乗るメールと同じ文言を送信した痕跡があり、携帯電話(スマートフォン)の付着物と片山被告のＤＮＡ型が一致
http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2014051900936

↓

5/20
行方がわからなくなっていたパソコン遠隔操作事件の片山祐輔被告が弁護団に対し「全部、自分が仕組んだことです」と一連のPC遠隔操作事件への関与、及び真犯人を名乗ったメールの送信を認めた。東京地裁は20日、保釈の取り消し請求を認める決定を出し、東京地検は被告の身柄を拘束した。勾留手続きを進め、東京拘置所に再び収容する。
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20140520-00000015-mai-soci

パソコン遠隔操作事件
http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%91%E3%82%BD%E3%82%B3%E3%83%B3%E9%81%A0%E9%9A%94%E6%93%8D%E4%BD%9C%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6

パソコン遠隔操作事件（パソコンえんかくそうさじけん）とは、2012年（平成24年）の初夏から秋にかけて、日本において、犯人がインターネットの電子掲示板を介して、他者のパソコン（PC）を遠隔操作し、これを踏み台として襲撃や殺人などの犯罪予告を行ったサイバー犯罪。遠隔操作ウイルス事件（えんかくそうさウイルスじけん）とも呼ばれる。

遠隔操作には、WEBサイトの脆弱性や、犯人が自作したトロイの木馬（トロイプログラム）"iesys.exe"（アイシスドットエグゼ）が使用された。

片山祐輔（かたやまゆうすけ）プロフィール
本名：同じ（旧姓：丑田）　　　年齢：31歳
学歴：学習院中等科卒業→学習院高等科卒業→東京電機大学中退→IT専門学校

性格
中学時代の同級生は「地味でおとなしい性格」
同じマンションに住む女性は「普段はおとなしく、オタクっぽい雰囲気だった」

・2005年、エイベックスが発売したCD「恋のマイアヒ」中の映像に登場するキャラクター「のまネコ」が、2ちゃんねる発のアスキーアートキャラクター「モナー」に似ているという「のまネコ」騒動をめぐって「エイベックス・グループ・ホールディングス」を標的とした殺害予告を大手掲示板サイト「2ちゃんねる」に書き込んだとして逮捕された前科あり。

・2008年2月からIT関連会社勤務、2012年12月に病気を理由に休職、2013年5月中旬に懲戒解雇。

・2009年1月、父親の丑田俊二氏が死去。IBMにエンジニアとして勤めるかたわら、アマチュアの数学研究者として著述業も行っていた。福島大学→日本IBMにSEとして入社→人事部に異動したエリート社員だった。片山祐輔は父親が死去した際に丑田から片山に改姓、それまでと同様に母親との生活を続け、2歳違いの弟は結婚して実家を離れた。

・2013年2月10日、威力業務妨害の疑いで逮捕された。2012年、遠隔操作ウィルスに感染させた愛知県内の男性のPCを遠隔操作し、「2ちゃんねる」上に殺害予告を書きこんだ疑い。逮捕の決め手は防犯カメラに写っていた片山祐輔の映像。後日、他にも幼稚園襲撃予告・伊勢神宮爆破予告・AKB48襲撃予告などのPC遠隔操作事件で逮捕・起訴された。

・2014年3月5日、東京拘置所から釈放、記者会見を行った。

Wikipedia
http://ja.yourpedia.org/wiki/%E7%89%87%E5%B1%B1%E7%A5%90%E8%BC%94

～～～～～
ウィキペデアでは、現在は氏名が消されて、Ｘとしてあるようです。でも、古く出た記事はそのまま、氏名入りで出ています。
http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%91%E3%82%BD%E3%82%B3%E3%83%B3%E9%81%A0%E9%9A%94%E6%93%8D%E4%BD%9C%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6

破廉恥罪という古い単語は今も有効です。恐ろしい。
昔の言葉では、人のうわさも７５日　ですが、ネットは簡単には忘れてくれませぬ。恐ろしい。

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池田信夫

Question book-new.svg
この項目の参考文献は、一次資料や記事主題の関係者による情報源に頼っています。信頼できる第三者情報源とされる出典の追加が求められています。（2013年9月）

曖昧さ回避 この項目では、経済学者について説明しています。野球選手・指導者については「池田信夫 (野球)」をご覧ください。

池田 信夫

生誕
1953年10月23日（60歳）[1]
京都府

国籍
日本の旗 日本

研究機関
アゴラ研究所（アゴラ (ブログ)運営者）

研究分野
イノベーション経済学（英語版）
情報産業論
メディア経済学（英語版）

母校
東京大学経済学部
慶應義塾大学大学院

影響を
受けた人物
青木昌彦
岡部光明
金子郁容
曽根泰教
國領二郎
浜田宏一

受賞
高橋亀吉記念賞
日本計画行政学会学会賞学術賞
テレコム社会科学賞
情報通信学会賞
テンプレートを表示

池田 信夫（いけだ のぶお、1953年〈昭和28年〉10月23日[1] ‐ ）は、日本の経済学者[2][3]（但し学位はない）、経済評論家[4][5]、ブロガー。日本放送協会（NHK）職員を経た後、現在SBI大学院大学客員教授、青山学院大学非常勤講師、株式会社アゴラ研究所代表取締役社長。

目次 [非表示]
1 人物 1.1 主義・主張・持論

2 経歴 2.1 学歴
2.2 職歴
2.3 NHK時代の活動

3 著書 3.1 単著
3.2 共著
3.3 共編著
3.4 翻訳

4 連載
5 脚注
6 関連項目
7 外部リンク

人物[編集]
複数のブログを持ち、時事問題、経済、科学などについてのコラムを自身のブログなどに掲載している。これまで多くの大学教授や評論家、政治家とネット上などで論争を繰り広げている[6]。

その内容は以下の記述のほか、本人が運営するブログを読むことで知ることができる。池田信夫 blog池田信夫blogベスト100

主義・主張・持論[編集]
##自身でウィキペディアの編集を行なっていることをブログ記事にもしており、時に編集の呼びかけなども行なっていた[7]。ウィキペディア日本版は質が悪く2ちゃんねる化しており、チェック体制を強め品質管理をきびしくすべきだと、そのあり方を批判している[8]。
##自由主義に基づく論調であり、著作権強化の反対[9]や、放送局からソフト制作の機能を分離（ハード・ソフトの分離）すべき[10]といった立場をとる。
##「労働者への太陽政策だ」として、雇用流動化が雇用を増やす旨を主張している[11]。2009年現在の雇用制度は経営者と労働組合が既得権益を守るために非正規社員を差別する「雇用カルテル」であり、正社員の解雇規制を緩和することで同一労働同一賃金を実現すべきとしている[12]。また、「ワーキングプア」問題の裏側には、働かない高給取り中高年の存在があるとし、それを「ノンワーキング・リッチ」と定義している[13]。
##大麻は毒性も依存性も、タバコや酒より低いため、タバコの喫煙リスクを自己責任で認めるなら、同じ理由で大麻を合法化すべき、大麻で逮捕するのはナンセンスであると主張している[14]。
##科学技術分野の国策プロジェクトでは、第五世代コンピュータは「史上最大の浪費プロジェクト」[15]、汎用京速計算機は「スパコンの名を借りた公共事業」、「時代錯誤の大艦巨砲プロジェクト」と批判した[16]。
##地球温暖化については地球温暖化懐疑論を唱えており、また民主党の二酸化炭素25%削減政策をポピュリズムと呼んで批判している[17]。
##日銀による金融の量的緩和には必要なときはすべきであるが、金融緩和は短期の景気対策で日本経済の実力(潜在成長率)を上げることはできないと主張している[18]。2006年の日銀の金融緩和により、日本からアメリカに流れたカネがアメリカの不動産バブルを増幅させ、サブプライムローン問題につながった。日本が大量の金融緩和をすると今度は中国に流れ、中国のバブルをさらに膨らませることになり、ひどい危機を引き起こすことは確実であると2011年の時点で主張している[18]。
##2011年2月の時点で日本人の個人金融資産と国債発行残高が実質的に並んでしまうため、日本国内で国債を買える余力は3年ぐらいで尽きると指摘している[18]。2012年に発足した第2次安倍内閣で円と国債が暴落するリスクを見込んで資産を外貨預金に移している[19]。池田は自身について財政の専門家でないと言及している[20]。
##福島第一原子力発電所事故について、被災者の人数を比較して震災の中では原発事故はマイナーな災害だと述べている[21]。また原発の欠点は安全性より経済性であり、「温室効果ガスを25％削減する」という国際公約さえ放棄すれば、新設する発電所は天然ガスに転換することが賢明と述べている[22]。また、原発は稼働させていくべきで、稼働してはいけないという法律根拠はないとしている。原発事故での放射能漏れをめぐって中部大学の武田邦彦などを強烈に批判した[6]。2011年11月、池田は、ライブドアのブログ集約サイト「BLOGOS」がその年、最も話題になったブログを表彰する「BLOGOS AWARD 2011」でブログメディア賞を受賞した。武田も同時にページビュー（PV）賞を受賞したが、その授賞式で行われたパネルディスカッションでは、武田が「科学的に正しいということは難しい定義なのだが、ブログという手段を通じて科学者が直接、情報を発信していくことで、みなさんの役に立てるのではないか」と語ったのに対して、池田は「たとえば原発問題でも、放射能によって大変なことが起きるなどPVを稼ぐために根拠のないデマのようなことを書くモラルのない人が少なからず存在する」などと応じ、直接意見を戦わせた[23][24]。
##橋下徹が消費税の地方税化を訴えていることに関して「冗談でなければ無知としか思えない」などとする記事を掲載したところ、逆に橋下から「何よりも、細かな知識を述べるだけで、事の本質を突いていない。これは行政をやったことがないからでしょう」との反論を受けた[25]。2012年5月、橋下が大飯原発の再稼動を容認したため、「君子豹変す」と橋下に対する評価を改め、同年12月に行われた第46回衆議院議員総選挙の投開票を目前に控えたツイートでは、独自に算定した「IQ」値による各政党トップのランク付けを発表し、橋下を第一位にした[6]。
##マクロ経済学は専門でないとしている[26]。
##"アベノミクスは「空気」で生まれ、「空気」のように消えた"[27]の中で、「名目金利＝実質金利＋期待インフレ率」と定義して、名目金利0.9％で期待インフレ率がインフレ目標の2%になると実質金利は2.9％になるという計算間違いの結果に基づいて、アベノミクスを批判した。また、実質金利の計算は、「小学生でもできる」と述べている。
##選択的夫婦別姓制度導入に賛同する。「入籍するとき別々にしたい人はして、子供はどちらかの姓を名乗ればいいだけのことだ。強制的に同姓にする必要はないし、それは『日本の伝統』でもない。」と述べる。同制度導入に反対するのは「家父長主義を保守と勘違いしたなんちゃって保守」とし、同制度に強硬に反対する高市早苗らの議員を批判している[28][29][30]。
##2009年は米国が大不況（前年の2008年10月は米国の失業率は6.6％で2014年1月も同水準の6.6％である[31]が、当時は大不況で10月には10.2％という記録的な水準に達していた[32]）に陥っていたが、池田はバラク・オバマの巨額の財政政策とベン・バーナンキの非伝統的金融政策を厳しく批判し、「政府の裁量的な介入は有害無益」「ケインズが復活したという表現は政治的にはそうだが、学問的には正しくない。」と述べていた[33]。

経歴[編集]
1953年〈昭和28年〉10月23日 京都府で京都市役所職員の子として生まれる[34]。

学歴[編集]
##1972年 - 京都府立洛北高等学校[35]卒業
##1978年 - 東京大学経済学部卒業
##1996年 - 慶應義塾大学大学院政策・メディア研究科政策・メディア専攻修士課程(1994年新設)修了
##1997年 - 慶應義塾大学大学院政策・メディア研究科政策・メディア専攻後期博士課程中退
##2005年 - 「情報通信産業のアーキテクチャについての研究」により、慶應義塾大学大学院政策・メディア研究科より博士（政策・メディア）を授与される。

職歴[編集]
##1978年 - NHK入局
##1993年 - NHKを退職
##1997年 - 国際大学グローバルコミュニケーションセンター（GLOCOM）助教授（-2000年）
##2000年 - 同教授（-2001年）
##2001年 - 独立行政法人経済産業研究所上席研究員（-2004年）
##2004年 - 国際大学GLOCOM教授・主幹研究員 （-2005年）
##2005年 ##須磨国際学園研究理事
##西和彦らと株式会社ITNY設立[36]
##情報通信政策フォーラム設立、理事・事務局長

##2006年 - 上武大学大学院客員教授
##2007年 - 上武大学大学院経営管理研究科教授（-2012年）
##2008年 - SBI大学院大学客員教授
##2009年（平成21年）1月、ライブドアの協力を得て、オピニオンサイト 『アゴラ』を開設[37]。
##2010年（平成22年）3月1日付で株式会社アゴラブックス（現・株式会社アゴラ研究所[38]）を設立し、代表取締役に就任[39]。同年6月2日より電子書籍の刊行を開始した[40]。

NHK時代の活動[編集]

朝日新聞社からも内定をもらっていたが、新人記者を警察記者クラブで研修させる「サツ回り」が嫌で断ったとブログでコメントしている[41]。
NHKでは報道局特報部でディレクターを務め[42]、『ニュースセンター9時』の制作に関わり[43]、『クローズアップ現代』では初代デスクを務めた[44]と語っている。
数千億円の受信料と税金を投じたにもかかわらず、結果として失敗に終わったアナログハイビジョンのプロジェクトメンバーだったが、「現場でハイビジョンの開発をしていた私たちにとって、それは衛星放送で限られたマニア向けに流すとか、業務用の高級AV商品」と考えていたと記している[45]。
1980年代には、ハイビジョン開発プロジェクトの一環として、ハイビジョン番組の制作に関わったこともあるが、(当時使っていた小さなモニターでは)ハイビジョンの画質のよさがよく分からなかったという[46]。

1991年に、終戦特集の番組の取材で、韓国で強制連行の被害者を探すため1ヶ月かけて50人ぐらいにインタビューしたが、軍に強制連行されたという人は1人もいなかった。しかし、それではネタにならないので、「日本にも道義的責任はある」という「告発調」の番組を作った[47][48]。

NHKを退職したのは39歳で管理職の辞令を受けたときだが、管理職になると番組制作には基本的に携わることができなくなり、制作費の管理というつまらない仕事をするだけだと述べている[49]。

著書[編集]

単著[編集]
##『情報通信革命と日本企業』 NTT出版（原著1997年4月）。
##『インターネット資本主義革命』 NTT出版（原著1999年3月）。
##『ブロードバンド戦略勝敗の分かれ目…情報通信社会主義の崩壊』 日本経済新聞社（原著2001年12月）。
##『ネットワーク社会の神話と現実--情報は自由を求めている』 東洋経済新報社（原著2003年5月）。
##『情報技術と組織のアーキテクチャ』 NTT出版（原著2005年6月）。
##『電波利権』〈新潮新書〉（原著2006年1月）。
##『ウェブは資本主義を超える 「池田信夫ブログ」集成』 日経BP社（原著2007年6月）。
##『過剰と破壊の経済学 「ムーアの法則」で何が変わるのか?』〈アスキー新書〉（原著2007年12月）。
##『ハイエク 知識社会の自由主義』 PHP新書（原著2008年8月）。
##『希望を捨てる勇気』 ダイヤモンド社（原著2009年10月）。
##『使える経済書100冊〜資本論からブラック・スワンまで〜』〈NHK出版新書〉（原著2010年4月）。
##『もし小泉進次郎がフリードマンの資本主義と自由を読んだら』〈日経BP社〉（原著2011年11月）。
##『原発「危険神話」の崩壊』〈PHP新書〉（原著2012年2月）。
##『新電波利権ver2』〈アゴラブックス〉（原著2012年2月18日）。
##『ムーアの法則が世界を変える』〈アゴラブックス〉（原著2012年2月20日）。
##『「空気」の構造: 日本人はなぜ決められないのか』〈白水社〉（原著2013年5月24日）。
##『アベノミクスの幻想: 日本経済に「魔法の杖」はない』〈東洋経済新報社〉（原著2013年8月）。

共著[編集]
##（西和彦・林紘一郎・原淳二郎・山田肇）『ネットがテレビを飲み込む日--Sinking of TV』 洋泉社、2006年6月。ISBN 9784862480460
##『ライブドアに物申す!!…44人の意見』 トランスワールドジャパン、2006年9月。ISBN 9784925112895
##（池尾和人）『なぜ世界は不況に陥ったのか』 日経BP社、2009年3月。
##（竹中平蔵・鈴木亘・土居丈朗）『日本経済「余命3年」＜徹底討論＞財政危機をどう乗り越えるか』 PHP研究所、2010年11月。ISBN 9784569792910
##（與那覇潤）『「日本史」の終わり 変わる世界、変われない日本人』 PHP研究所、2012年9月。

共編著[編集]
##（奥野正寛）『情報化と経済システムの転換』 東洋経済新報社、2001年9月。ISBN 9784492312971
##（林紘一郎）『ブロードバンド時代の制度設計』 東洋経済新報社、2002年4月。ISBN 9784492313053

翻訳[編集]
##リン・マーギュリス、ドリオン・セーガン『生命とはなにか…バクテリアから惑星まで』 せりか書房、1998年4月。ISBN 9784796702133

連載[編集]
##池田信夫の一刀両断（PC Japan）
##池田信夫の「サイバーリバタリアン」(ASCII.jp)

脚注[編集]

1.^ a b “池田信夫 （いけだのぶお）”. 覚悟の瞬間（とき）:やりたいことを極めた大人がカッコイイ. 2012年12月27日閲覧。
2.^ 岩本有平 (2010年3月26日). “池田信夫氏や西和彦氏ら、新会社で電子書籍出版へ--著者を公募”. CNET Japan. 2012年2月6日閲覧。
3.^ 孫社長と池田信夫さんが「光の道」対談(ITMedia)
4.^ 「Part 5 反貧困の処方箋 中間層の無関心が社会を壊す Interview 経済評論家●池田信夫」『週刊ダイヤモンド』3月21日号、ダイヤモンド社、2009年。
5.^ 「20日から「事業仕分け第2弾」生中継〜片山さつき氏ら参加の討論特別番組も」　RBB TODAY、2010年5月13日。
6.^ a b c “橋下氏がトップ、安倍氏が最下位　政治家「IQランク」、ネットでは「全くの逆」と大不評”. J-CASTニュース (2012年12月10日). 2013年1月31日閲覧。
7.^ 池田信夫. “ウィキペディアとの闘い”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
8.^ 池田信夫. “2ちゃんねる化するウィキペディア”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
9.^ 池田信夫 (2009年10月8日). “著作権法は現代の禁酒法”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
10.^ 池田信夫 (2009年8月12日). “通信と放送の融合を恐れるテレビ局”. 池田信夫の「サイバーリバタリアン」. 2013年1月7日閲覧。
11.^ 池田信夫 (2009年2月10日). “雇用流動化で失業率は下がる”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
12.^ 池田信夫 (2009年6月18日). “経営者と労働組合の雇用カルテル”. アゴラ. 2009年6月19日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2009年6月19日閲覧。
13.^ 池田信夫 (2008年6月30日). “ノンワーキング・リッチ”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
14.^ 池田信夫 (2008年11月16日). “大麻で逮捕するならタバコを禁止せよ”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
15.^ 池田信夫 (2006年8月16日). “第五世代コンピュータ”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
16.^ 池田信夫 (2007年11月23日). “スパコンの戦艦大和「京速計算機」”. 池田信夫 blog. 2013年12月11日閲覧。
17.^ 温室効果ガス「25％削減」というポピュリズム
18.^ a b c “経済論戦勝ったのはどっちだ!森永卓郎vs.池田信夫　激突120分”. 週刊現代 (2011年2月24日). 2013年1月31日閲覧。
19.^ 2%のインフレ目標は可能か池田信夫blog 2012年12月21日
20.^ 経済の死角 激論vol．1「日本の財政破綻は本当に起きるのか」 エコノミスト、論客たちが徹底討論「2011年 どうなる日本経済」vol.1現代ビジネス 2011年1月20日
21.^ 浜岡原発の「バカの壁」アゴラ -ライブドアブログ 2012年9月11日
22.^ 池田信夫 (2011年6月5日). “原発についてのまとめ”. 池田信夫 blog. 2011年6月24日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2011年9月27日閲覧。
23.^ “ブロゴス・アワード2011　大賞に「Chikirinの日記」”. J-CASTニュース (2011年12月6日). 2013年1月31日閲覧。
24.^ 徳永浩 (2011年12月6日). “ブログの発信力がマスコミを超えるには＝BLOGOS AWARD”. サーチナ. 2013年1月31日閲覧。
25.^ “橋下大阪市長ウォッチ 60ツイートのヒートアップバトル 橋下氏「知識述べるだけ」、池田氏「論点すり替え」”. J-CASTニュース (2012年4月9日). 2013年1月31日閲覧。
26.^ 池田信夫 (2009年11月9日). “デフレFAQ”. 池田信夫 blog. 2012年6月5日閲覧。
27.^ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUXcQhxKtL0
28.^ 「『なんちゃって保守』の笑劇」ーBLOGOS 2013年11月12日
29.^ 本人ブログ
30.^ JBPress 2013.11.21
31.^ 失業率は2008年10月以来の6.6％に低下東洋経済 2014年2月8日
32.^ 10月の米失業率は10.2％、1983年以来26年ぶりAFP 2009年11月7日
33.^ 大不況の経済学アゴラ　2009年03月28日
34.^ 「池田信夫@ikedanob私の父は事なかれ主義の総本山、京都市役所の職員だった。あれは特権じゃなくて差別の一種。」
35.^ 2012年6月6日 - 7:37のツイート
36.^ 西和彦、山田肇、田中良拓と一緒に、ITNY & パートナーズという株式会社を設立した。商号は4人のパートナーのイニシャルを並べたもの。ITNYの仕事は「ITについての戦略コンサルティング」。池田信夫 (2005年5月29日). “ITNY”. 池田信夫 blog. 2009年8月13日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2009年8月13日閲覧。
37.^ 目黒譲二 (2009年1月26日). “ライブドア、池田信夫氏を編集長とするオピニオンブログ「アゴラ」を開設”. CNET Japan. シーネットネットワークスジャパン. 2009年8月13日閲覧。
38.^ “会社案内”. 株式会社アゴラ研究所. 2013年1月3日閲覧。
39.^ 池田信夫 (2010年3月3日). “電子出版はすでに始まっている”. 池田信夫blog. 2011年4月25日閲覧。
40.^ “アゴラブックス　電子書店をオープン”. 株式会社アゴラブックス. 2011年4月25日閲覧。
41.^ 池田信夫 (2008年11月23日). “警察ネタの過剰”. 池田信夫 blog. 2009年8月13日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2008年11月27日閲覧。
42.^ 池田信夫-上武大学大学院-教授-経営管理研究科の経歴・公式プロフィール・ソーシャルグラフ
43.^ 池田信夫 (2008年11月17日). “古舘伊知郎氏が「格差社会」を語る気味悪さ”. 池田信夫 blog. 2008年12月27日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2008年11月20日閲覧。
44.^ 入江大輔 (2010年12月3日). “メディアの未来像を考える〜進化するネットメディア 変化するマスメディア 〜”. BLOGOS. ライブドア. 2010年12月3日閲覧。
45.^ 『電波利権』 66頁
46.^ 『電波利権』 64-65頁。
47.^ 朝日新聞は歴史認識を語れ 池田信夫 blog、2007年06月27日
48.^ 遅れてきた帝国主義 池田信夫 blog、2012年8月7日
49.^ 池田信夫 (2009年1月29日). “終身雇用がメディアをだめにする”. アゴラ. ライブドア. 2009年8月13日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2009年1月29日閲覧。

関連項目[編集]
##西和彦 - アゴラ出版局代表取締役。
##浦崎宏 - ビーエス・コンディショナルアクセスシステムズ（B-CAS）社長で元NHK経済部次長。NHK時代池田と共にNHKスペシャル「追跡・不良債権12兆円」を制作した。
##アゴラ（ライブドア）

外部リンク[編集]
##池田信夫 (@ikedanob) - Twitter（以前は「Dogbert」のイラストをアイコンに使用していた）
##池田信夫 blog - 公式ブログ
##池田信夫 : アゴラ - ライブドアブログ
##RIETI―池田 信夫 - 経済産業研究所在籍当時の紹介ページ
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2003年度 政治・経済部門

Political Economy 選評

津上 俊哉 （つがみ としや）
『中国台頭』
――　日本は何をなすべきか　　　　　　（日本経済新聞社）
1957年、愛媛県新居浜市生まれ。
1980年、東京大学法学部卒業（私法コース専攻）。
通商産業省に入省。産業政策局商政課、通商政策局国際経済部公正貿易推進室長、在中国日本大使館経済部参事官、通商政策局北西アジア課長などを経て、2002年より独立行政法人経済産業研究所上席研究員。
専門は中国経済、日中関係、東アジア経済統合。
著書　『日中関係の転機－東アジア経済統合への挑戦』（共著、東洋経済新報社）


中国経済の実像をつかむのはまことに骨が折れる。
　＜写真撮影に喩えれば、被写体が「大きい」せいでファインダーに入りきらない、奥行きも深いのでピントもなかなか合わせられない。離れて見ようとすると、今度は細部がわからなくなる。＞
　著者は、こんな巧みな喩えで、複雑系の中国経済を把握することの難しさを指摘している。
　それから、それに自ら敢然と試みるのである。
　その厄介な対象の「内部」に迫り、データを収集し、分析し、中国の企業家や政策当局者のホンネを聞き、それらを踏まえて仮設を立て、もう一度、「現実」皮膜に漉してみる。そして、その日本への意味合いを読みとり、日本の改革を促進すべく『中国台頭』を善玉ガイアツへと転換させ、日中ウィン・ウィンの関係再構築の青写真を描く。
　90年代後半、北京の日本大使館経済参事官として中国に駐在したときの取材と省察を糧としている。これは著者の手堅いフィールドワークの産物である。
　帰国してからは経済産業省で日中経済関係を担当した。中国の巨大な変化に即した形の日中経済交流を始めなければならない。従来の交流団体の「窓口」依存の限界は明らかだ。それまでに培った人脈をたぐり寄せ、これはという個々の企業経営者に直接連絡し、日本まで自費で来てもらい、日本の企業経営者と商機を探求する新しい交流方式を経済産業省の仲間とともに編み出した。2001年から始めた日中経済討論会である。この間、中文電子メールのやりとりは約800通。日中経済討論会はその後、定例化した。それこそ著者の軽快なフットワークの賜物である。
　ただ、著者の視線は単なる中国屋のそれではない。中国の改革・開放の歩みを子細に分析することで、日本の改革・開放への意味合いを探ろうとする政策プロの国家経営の視点がここにはある。財政、農村・農民、人口、高齢化、失業など、気が遠くなるような中国の諸問題を抑えた上で、著者は「中国から学ぶ」という分析視角を据える。
　例えば、原始的だが力強い中国の資本主義の躍動を伝えつつ、経済活力のカギは、結局のところ資本を手にすることが出来るかどうか、資本市場を真剣に活用できるかどうかなのだ、と喝破する。
　＜日本の企業で、「来年、再来年、ニューヨーク証取に行くぞ」と思い立って本当に上場できる会社が何社あるだろうか？＞
　イデオロギー的賛美の類は別として、日本経済の問題を「中国から学ぶ」角度からこのように鋭利に抉った論考はこれまでなかった。
　何よりも爽快なのは、日中の共存共栄の構想を、未来への展望という大きな器に盛って私たちの前に示してくれたことである。文中から察せられる著者のおおらかな包容力、つまりは器の大きさならではの精神の「漲り」のようなものがここには湛えられている。
　『中国台頭』時代をよりよく生き抜くために――日本にとって死活的な隣国とのつきあい方のコモン・センスの書である。

船橋 洋一（朝日新聞社コラムニスト）評　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（所属・役職等は受賞時のもの、敬称略）
～～～～～～
世の中のことは、
５年くらいで見直しを繰り返すべきだ。
まして、その２倍の、１０年！

激賞が、逆転することもあり得るわけである。
著者は、敏感で、潮目の違いをよく見抜いていると見える。

私は、１０年前から中国共産党には、現代国家を経営することは無理だと思っていた。
いま、やはり、そういう判断が間違わなかったと、考えつつある。

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今、平成二十六（２０１４）年。
平均的な日本人は、平均的な韓国人より豊かであろう。
いくら、なんでも４年のうちに抜かれてしまうとは考えにくい。そう簡単なものではない。
私の経験でいうと、飯田経夫先生が『「豊かさ」とは何か－現代社会の視点』（講談社現代新書）を発表されたのが1980年であった。そのとき、すでに日本の平均はイギリスはじめヨーロッパ諸国に追いつきはじめていた。
数字の上では、そうだったが、実感としては、どうだったのかと言えば、体感しているでしょうと書かれていることを相当に考え込んだうえで、どうやら了承できた。
じっさいには、サヨク系の揚げ足取り論調が主流だったので、素直に「了解」という人は少なかったようだ。
さらに年月が経過してゆくにつれて、やはり日本が豊かになったという声が大きくなっていった。
分岐点が、（当時の）今＝昭和五十五（１９８０）年ころのことだったと指摘できる。

昭和４０年代、東京の隅田川に近づくと、くっさい船がつながって下ってゆく。
実は、キタナイ話だが、糞尿を太平洋に捨てに行くのであった。
隅田の川、それ自体が墨のようなどす黒い流れであった。
下水処理が進められて、そのようなことが大きく減少していった。
年々、少しづつ、川がキレイになっていった。今では大正～昭和のはじめころ程度になったらしい。
（平成も２０年代になった先年、また先日、隅田川のほとりを歩くことがあって、改めて実感した。これも豊かさなのだと・・・・）

さて、韓国は今どういう状態なのだろう。
モレ知るところでは、糞尿汚水を処理できず、海洋投棄をやっておるという。竹島近海がその投棄水域なのだという。
なにが言いたいのかと言うと…

韓国は今もビンボーだということ。ビンボーだから、もうしばらくは、海を汚すことを了承してやる必要があるのかも知れぬ。日本に追いつくのなら、このような海洋汚染は許されない。

昭和三十（１９５５）年のこと、私は小学５年生。給食から赤痢が集団発生した。私のいた小学校でのこと。
当時は、水洗トイレなんて、ほとんど存在しなかった。そういう事情だったから、赤痢などという伝染病がときどき国内のどこかで発生した。
昭和５０年代はじめのこと、場所は川崎市のどこか、糞尿浄化施設が、コレラ（だったと記憶する）菌に汚染されていて、川伝いに東京湾に流れ込んでいたので、ちょっとした騒ぎがあった。川崎市の河口付近からさかのぼって原因箇所が特定できた。汚水処理が進展中だったのだろう。

さて
アト４年のうちに、韓国経済が伸びるのか、日本経済が縮むのか　して、日本が抜かれてしまうという。
そういう予見発表である。

下水設備などを普及させるには、年々努力しても少しずつしか改善できない。アト４年じゃとてもむりだろう。
数字で所得水準が追い付くなどありえないだろう。

この記事は、ムーディーズによるのだという。
途方もない、無責任記事となるであろう。私の予言が当たるか、天下のムーディーズが当たるか。
ムーディーズのような格付け会社というのは、実に無責任で不見識らしい。
４～５年ここに残しておこう。

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(Provisional Translation)
Details of Exchanges Between Japan
and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
Regarding the Comfort Women Issue
~ From the Drafting of the Kono Statement to
the Asian Women’s Fund ~
June 20, 2014
Study Team on the Details Leading to the Drafting of the Kono Statement etc.
Keiichi Tadaki, lawyer (former Prosecutor-General) (Chair)
Hiroko Akizuki, Professor, Faculty of International Relations, Asia University
Makiko Arima, journalist, former Director of the Asian Women’s Fund
Mariko Kawano, Professor, Faculty of Law, Waseda University
Ikuhiko Hata, modern historian
Secretariat (Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
1
The Study Team on the Drafting Process of the Kono Statement etc.
-- Study Conducted at the Study Meetings --
1. Background to the Study
(1) At the House of Representatives Budget Committee hearing held on February 20,
2014, former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara testified with regards
to the Kono Statement that (i) no post factum corroborating investigation was
conducted on the result of the hearings of former comfort women that is said to have
served as the basis of the Kono Statement; (ii) there is a possibility that in the　
drafting process of the Kono Statement, the language was compared and coordinated
with the Republic of Korea (ROK) side; and (iii) as a result of announcing the Kono
Statement, problems of the past between Japan and the ROK were once settled, but
have recently been brought up again by the ROK government, and it is extremely
regrettable that the good intentions of the Government of Japan at that time are not
being recognized.
(2) Following the testimony, in response to a question in the Diet, Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yoshihide Suga answered that the process leading to the drafting of the
Kono Statement and understanding what actually occurred at that time should be
clarified in an appropriate manner.
(3) Based on this background, the team undertook a study regarding the sequence of
processes, centering on the exchanges with the ROK during the process leading to
the drafting of the Kono Statement and extending to the Asian Women’s Fund, which
was a follow-up measure subsequent to the Statement. Accordingly, the Study Team
did not undertake inquiries and studies aimed at grasping the historical facts of the
comfort women issue itself.
2. Schedule of Meetings Held
Friday, April 25, 2014 Preparatory meeting
Wednesday, May 14 First meeting
Friday, May 30 Second meeting
Friday, June 6 Third meeting
Tuesday, June 10 Fourth meeting
2
3. The Study Team’s Members
In order to ensure complete confidentiality, the members of the Study Team perused
relevant documents after they were sworn in as part-time government officials.
Keiichi Tadaki, lawyer (former Prosecutor-General) (Chair)
Hiroko Akizuki, Professor, Faculty of International Relations,
Asia University
Makiko Arima, journalist, former Director of the Asian Women’s Fund
Mariko Kawano, Professor, Faculty of Law, Waseda University
Ikuhiko Hata, modern historian
4. Period Covered by the Study
The study covered the period from the early half of the 1990s, when the comfort women
issue emerged as an outstanding issue between Japan and the ROK, up to the
completion of the Asian Women’s Fund’s projects in the ROK.
5. Study Method
(1) The study covered a series of documents concerning the comfort women issue held
by the Office of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary, which took over the duties of
the Cabinet Councilors’ Office on External Affairs. At that time, the Cabinet
Councilors’ Office on External Affairs was carrying out the government inquiry that
led up to the Kono Statement and the administrative duties leading to the
announcement of the Kono Statement together with a series of documents on the
comfort women issue that mainly includes exchanges between Japan and the ROK
and a series of documents on the Asian Women’s Fund as a follow-up measure,
which are held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(2) On the condition of complete confidentiality, testimonies from hearings of the
former comfort women, former military personnel and other relevant parties were
also made available to members of the Study Team for their perusal. Additionally,
during the process of the study, in order to supplement the documents-based study,
the Cabinet Secretariat carried out hearings of government personnel who were in
charge of the hearings of the former comfort women at that time.
(3) In undertaking the study, based on the abovementioned documents, testimonies and
outcomes of hearings that the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
made available to the Study Team for studying, the Team grasped the facts and
objectively confirmed the series of processes.
3
6. Study Results by the Study Team
Under the instruction of the Study Team, based on relevant documents designated for
their study, the administrative authorities of the government compiled a report of facts
as attached. The Study Team concluded that the content of the report was valid, insofar
as the documents that were made available during the study process.
June 20, 2014
Study Team on the Details Leading to the Drafting of the Kono Statement etc.
Keiichi Tadaki, lawyer (former Prosecutor-General) (Chair)
Hiroko Akizuki, Professor, Faculty of International Relations,
Asia University
Makiko Arima, journalist, former Director of the Asian Women’s Fund
Mariko Kawano, Professor, Faculty of Law, Waseda University
Ikuhiko Hata, modern historian
Table of Contents
I．Details of the Drafting of the Kono Statement
1 Exchanges Between Japan and the ROK up to Prime Minister Miyazawa’s Visit to the
ROK (up to January 1992)…………………………………………………………….1
2 Exchanges between Japan and the ROK during the Period between Prime Minister
Miyazawa’s Visit to the ROK up to the Announcement by Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kato (the Announcement of the Findings of the Inquiry) (From January 1992 to July
1992)………………………………………………………………………………..…2
3 Exchanges Between Japan and the ROK During the Period Between Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kato’s Announcement and Prior to the Statement by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kono (July 1992 to August 1993)…………………………………………..4
4 Details of the Hearings of the Former Comfort Women……………………………....9
5 Communication on the Wording of the Kono Statement…………………………….13
II. Details of the activities of the “National Fund for Asian Peace and Women” in the ROK
1 Up to the Establishment of the Fund (1993 to 1994)………………………………...20
2 The Initial Period after the Establishment of the Fund (1995 to 1996)……………...23
3 Implementing Projects for Seven Former Comfort Women (January 1997)………...24
4 The Temporary Suspension of the Fund (February 1997 to January 1998)……...…..26
5 The Fund Places Advertisements in Newspapers (January 1998)…………..…..…...27
6 The Temporary Suspension of Payments of Atonement Money through the Fund
(February 1998 to February 1999)………………………………………………..……...27
7 Conversion to Medical and Welfare Projects by the Korean Red Cross (March
1999-July 1999)…………………………….…………………………………….……...28
8 The Suspension of the Fund with Difficulties of Converting the Project (July 1999 to
May 2002)……………………………………………………………………...………...28
9 The Results of the Fund’s Activities in the ROK……………………...……………..29
1
Details of Exchanges Between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
Regarding the Comfort Women Issue
-- From the Drafting of the Kono Statement to the Asian Women’s Fund --
June 20, 2014
I. Details of the Drafting of the Kono Statement
1. Exchanges Between Japan and the ROK up to Prime Minister Miyazawa’s Visit to the
ROK (up to January 1992)
(1) After the first former comfort woman came forward in the ROK on August 14, 1991,
three former comfort women from the ROK filed a lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court
on December 6 of the same year. Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa was scheduled to
visit the ROK in January 1992, but amid growing interest in the comfort women issue
and mounting anti-Japanese criticism in the ROK, diplomatic authorities in Japan and
the ROK became concerned that the issue would surface as an outstanding issue during
the Prime Minister’s visit to the ROK. On a number of occasions from December 1991,
the ROK side conveyed its view that it would be desirable for the Japanese side to take
some kind of action in advance so that the comfort women issue would not surface as an
outstanding issue when Prime Minister Miyazawa visits the ROK. At the same time, the
ROK sought a response to the issue prior to the Prime Minister’s visit and requested that
Japan take steps to ensure the issue did not create friction between the two countries,
such as by having the Japanese side address the idea of expressing some kind of
position perhaps in the form of a Cabinet Secretary statement, and demonstrating a
stance of remorse, prior to the Prime Minister’s ROK visit. As of December 1991, the
Japanese side was already confidentially considering within their government that, “It
would be appropriate if the Prime Minister could effectively accept the involvement of
the Japanese military, and make an expression of remorse and regret,” but also that,
“There is a possibility that public opinion in the ROK will not be appeased simply with
a verbal apology alone.” One option that was being cited was to make a symbolic
gesture in the form of erecting a memorial for the comfort women.
2
(2) In December 1991, under the coordination of the Cabinet Councilors’ Office on
External Affairs, the Japanese side launched a study involving all potentially relevant
ministries and agencies. On January 7, 1992, it was reported that documents had been
discovered at the National Institute for Defense Studies indicating the involvement of
the military. Subsequently, as a result of a January 11, 1992 report on these documents
by the Asahi Shimbun, anti-Japanese criticism inside the ROK heated up. At a regular
press conference on January 13, 1992, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato stated that, “At the
present point in time, we are not at the stage of stating what degree of involvement took
place and what form it took, but involvement by the military cannot be denied,” and that
“I would like to offer my heartfelt feelings of apology and remorse to those who
underwent immeasurable and painful experiences as so-called wartime comfort
women.”
(3) At a Summit Meeting held during Prime Minister Miyazawa’s visit to the ROK from
January 16 to 18 1992, President Roh Tae-woo stated that he “appreciates the
acknowledgement of the former Japanese military’s involvement by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kato and his expression of apology and remorse. Going forward, I expect that
Japan will take the necessary measures and strive to clarify the facts.” Prime Minister
Miyazawa stated that, “It has reached the point where I know of the undeniable fact that
the former Japanese military had been involved in recruiting wartime comfort women,
managing comfort stations and so forth. The Government of Japan has decided to
acknowledge this publicly and make a heartfelt apology.” Prime Minister Miyazawa
added that he wanted to “express my heartfelt feelings of apology and remorse to those
who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences as wartime comfort women,” and
that “an inquiry has been taking place at the relevant government ministries and
agencies from the end of last year, and from here forward we also intend to continue to
search for documents and clarify the facts wholeheartedly.”
2. Exchanges between Japan and the ROK during the Period between Prime Minister
Miyazawa’s Visit to the ROK up to the Announcement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato
(the Announcement of the Findings of the Inquiry) (From January 1992 to July 1992)
(1) Following Prime Minister Miyazawa’s visit to the ROK, in January 1992 the ROK
government announced a “government policy concerning the volunteer corps issue,” in
which it said it would “pursue thorough clarification of the facts and appropriate
compensatory and other measures accompanying that, from the Government of Japan.”
On the Japanese side, in addition to an inquiry aimed at clarifying the facts, it
3
considered “holding discussions in order to exchange ideas with the ROK side
regarding measures that the Government of Japan can take independently, from a
humanitarian perspective, in regards to the so-called wartime comfort women issue,
separate to the framework of the legal resolution of 1965,” and ideas were sought
confidentially from the ROK side.
(2) The inquiry into relevant documents at various ministries and agencies that the
Japanese side launched in December 1991 continued until June 1992. Prior to the
announcement of the results of that inquiry, the ROK side asked that the inquiry be of a
level that is convincing to the government and citizens of the ROK, and proposed
holding unofficial, advance discussions at the working level regarding the
announcement of the inquiry findings.
Additionally, just prior to the announcement, various exchanges took place with the
ROK side regarding the manner in which the inquiry results would be announced. This
included a suggestion from the ROK side that in addition to the announcement of the
inquiry results themselves, it should include an expression of the Government of Japan’s
views on the inquiry results as well as proposed post-inquiry measures.
Regarding the content of the inquiry results, the ROK side praised the Government
of Japan’s efforts in carrying out the inquiry in good faith, while pointing out that
overall there was a major gap between the results and the expectations of the ROK side
and that there was a possibility that this would aggravate sentiment and public opinion
among the citizens of the ROK. Furthermore, the ROK requested that the facts continue
to be clarified, including the issue of whether or not there was “coerciveness” involved
at the time of recruitment, and that, “follow-up measures” (compensation and inclusion
in textbooks) be taken, and stated that, “the course of public opinion on the ROK side
was of concern given that the inquiry findings did not include any indication of clear
evidence of forced mobilization which had been found in the testimonies etc. of the
relevant individuals at the time.” Incidentally, ahead of the announcement of the inquiry
findings by the Government of Japan, in July 1992, the ROK government announced
the progress of its own inquiry into and study about the comfort women issue among
others, but also on that occasion, it sought comment from the Japanese side in advance.
As a result, prior adjustments were made by the two countries.
(3) On July 6, 1992, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato announced at a press conference the
findings of the inquiry up to that point. The Chief Cabinet Secretary acknowledged that
based on the inquiry that was carried out on documents at the ministries and agencies
4
that might hold such relevant materials, “the Government had been involved in the
establishment of comfort stations, the control of those who recruited comfort women,
the construction and reinforcement of comfort facilities, the management and
surveillance of comfort stations, the hygiene maintenance in comfort stations and
among comfort women, and the issuance of identification as well as other documents to
those who were related to comfort stations.” He stated that “the Government again
would like to express its sincere apology and remorse to all those who have suffered
indescribable hardship as so-called ‘wartime comfort women,’ and that “by listening to
the opinions of people from various directions, I would like to consider sincerely in
what way we can express our feelings to those who suffered such hardship.” At the
same time, in response to questions regarding the issue of whether any documents
substantiating to forced or deceitful recruitment were discovered during the inquiry, he
responded that such documents “have thus far not been discovered.”
(4) Incidentally, it is evident that various deliberations took place within the ROK, on
“compensation” and in connection with the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems
Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation Between Japan and the
ROK. Issues pondered included whether a review would be needed to determine if the
ROK’s claim had already been settled legally, or at that point in time, it should not make
a new request to the Japanese side for compensation.
3. Exchanges Between Japan and the ROK During the Period Between Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kato’s Announcement and Prior to the Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kono (July 1992 to August 1993)
(1) Even following Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato’s announcement, harsh views
regarding the comfort women issue did not disappear from public opinion in the ROK.
Under such circumstances, the Cabinet Councilors’ Office on External Affairs and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued an examination of future measures regarding the
comfort women issue. In a discussion that took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in early October 1992, the need to resolve the issue during the term of the Roh Tae-woo
Administration (the ROK held a presidential election in December 1992) was
acknowledged. Also in early October, under Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara,
officials from the Cabinet Councilors’ Office on External Affairs and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs discussed future plans concerning the comfort women issue. In those
discussions it was confirmed that the items to be considered in the future in relation to
the comfort women issue were: (i) future initiatives concerning the clarification of facts;
5
(ii) measures of some sort towards the ROK; (iii) measures for countries and regions
other than the ROK; (iv) an approach to the Japanese Red Cross Society (hereafter
referred to as “the JRC”) (namely, a request for cooperation in order to implement (ii));
and (v) the establishment of a bipartisan council of Diet members. Of these items, on
the clarification of the facts, it was decided that although the scope of the
document-based inquiry would be expanded, conducting interviews with former
comfort women would be difficult. Additionally, on measures towards the ROK, it was
envisaged that a fund would be set up within the JRC, and with the cooperation of the
Korean Red Cross (hereafter referred to as “the KRC”) it would implement welfare
measures mainly covering former comfort women.
(2) Based on the abovementioned plans, at a mid-October 1992 exchange between
working-level officials from Japan and the ROK, the Japanese side communicated -- as
an unofficial position -- the idea of a package of two items comprising (i) establishing a
fund at the JRC that would implement measures expressing Japan’s feelings over the
comfort women issue to the ROK and other countries; and (ii) implementing measures
such as expanding the scope of the agencies and ministries covered in the clarification
of the facts and gathering documents held by central and regional libraries. The ROK
side’s response to this package was that (i) what is important is clarifying the facts; (ii)
from the ROK citizens’ standpoint, an explanation that, it is not known whether or not
force was involved because documents have not been found, makes it appear that the
matter is being dismissed as a formality and that no genuine effort is being made; and
(iii) it is important for victims and perpetrators to be interviewed and for the
Government of Japan to admit that comfort women arose out of force.
(3) As a result of these reactions from the ROK side, the Japanese side again explored
its response plans. In late October, based on the basic standpoint that in order to build a
future-oriented Japan-ROK relationship, efforts should be made to try to settle this issue
before the change in the ROK’s administration, a plan was decided upon and was
communicated to the ROK. This involved proposing to the ROK side that a resolution
to the issue be pursued using a package comprising (i) clarification of the facts by
adopting additional measures such as expanding the scope of the document-based
inquiry, holding interviews with (several) representatives of former comfort women, and
arriving at a conclusion. Although reaching a definite recognition would be difficult
with regards to the issue of the involvement of “coerciveness,” demonstrating a degree
of recognition by stating that “it cannot be denied that some elements of coerciveness
6
also existed”); and (ii) “measures to express our feelings” (envisaged as an
establishment of a fund within the JRC that would implement mainly welfare measures
while cooperating with the KRC).
(4) However, because of the presidential election in December 1992, discussions with
the ROK side were not progressing, and the ROK’s response was that it wanted to
discuss the matter in earnest after the presidential election. As a result, the Japanese side
decided on a plan to coordinate with staff in the new ROK administration and try to
settle the issue fully and promptly. In doing so, it was decided that responses going
forward would include: (i) implementing measures in order to clarify the facts; (ii)
making details of the follow-up measures as concrete as possible; and (iii) sounding out
to the ROK side once again about presenting a degree of recognition, “in combination
with follow-up measures and as an outcome of measures to clarify the facts” that
“conceivably there were also some elements of ‘coerciveness.’” In that regard, measures
for clarifying the facts that were cited included: (i) expanding the scope of the inquiry;
(ii) obtaining the findings of the ROK’s inquiry; (iii) seeking the opinions of people
concerned and experts on the Japanese side; and (iv) seeking the opinions of
representatives of former comfort women. However, it was decided that seeking the
opinions of representatives of former comfort women would be carried out “at the final
stages, once there is a prospect of obtaining the ROK side’s cooperation on the
conclusion of the clarification of facts and the follow-up measures” and that this effort
“be kept to a minimum.”
(5) In December 1992, before and after the ROK presidential election, the Japanese side
successively explained its basic standpoint to the ROK side.
On the clarification of facts, the Japanese side explained that (i) the Government of
Japan had thus far been striving to clarify the facts, but reaching a 100% level of
clarification is always impossible in the first place; (ii) the recruitment of comfort
women probably involved “coerciveness” in some cases and not in others, but it would
probably not be possible to determine that ratio; and (iii) at the final stages, Japanese
government officials are thinking of possibly expressing in some manner that there were
elements of “coerciveness” as an acknowledgement by the Government of Japan after
meeting with and listening to representatives of comfort women, and also referring to
the findings of the ROK government’s inquiry. In response, the ROK side stated that (i)
even if (the comfort women) theoretically went of their own free will, it is conceivable
that the circumstances once they arrived were different to what they had been told; and
7
(ii) it is important to recognize that these women did not become comfort women
voluntarily.
With regard to follow-up measures, the Japanese side explained that while legally
such matters were settled, it did recognize that given the nature of the issue it was not
simply a case of illegal activities and that it was a moral issue of how to display good
faith. Japan explained that in implementing follow-up measures, it would listen
carefully to the ROK side’s opinions as a reference, but that basically the measures
would be implemented by Japan voluntarily.
(6) In February 1993, President Kim Young-sam was appointed. Around February and
March 1993, in considerations relating to the Japanese side’s policies, the basic
perspective adopted by Japan was that “the issue could be resolved in a package deal in
which the ROK government will accept the implementation of measures of some sort in
return for the Government of Japan’s conclusions regarding the clarification of the facts,”
and “where the clarification of facts is concerned, the possibility of demonstrating our
recognition through an expression of some sort that recruiting also took place in a way
that partially involved the elements of “coerciveness” is being considered,” and that
“with regard to measures that can be taken, consideration has been given to setting up a
fund and implementing welfare measures via a counterpart of a relevant country (or
region).” Regarding the issue of “coerciveness,” the plan that was presented called for
“an approach to be made to the ROK government, that the Government of Japan is
prepared to acknowledge, for example, that it is not possible to deny some involvement
by the military and government authorities and that there were cases in which women
became wartime comfort women ‘in a manner that was against their own will’.”
Additionally, with regard to interviewing representatives of former comfort women, the
plan mentioned that “Consideration will be given to implementing this as a ceremony,
so to speak, and in the minimum necessary format at the final stages when there is a
prospect of obtaining the ROK side’s cooperation on the conclusion of the clarification
of facts and the follow-up measures, while taking into account relations with other
countries and regions” (details of the hearings are discussed below).
(7) Commenting on the comfort women issue on March 13, 1993, ROK President Kim
Young-sam, who had been appointed in February, stated that “We do not plan to demand
material compensation from the Government of Japan. Compensation will be
undertaken using the budget of the ROK government from next year. Doing so will
undoubtedly make it possible to pursue a new Japan-ROK relationship by claiming the
8
moral high-ground.”
During working-level discussions between Japan and the ROK that took place in
mid-March 1993, the Japanese side entered discussions with a working plan that
centered on (i) resolving the comfort women issue promptly; (ii) requesting the ROK
government to implement measures towards public opinion; and (iii) in light of the
aforementioned statement by President Kim Young-sam, confirming the ROK
government’s plans and the ROK’s position regarding measures to be undertaken by
Japan. Within this working plan, the Japanese side decided to “concretely sound out the
fact that the Government of Japan is prepared to demonstrate a degree of recognition
with regard to the involvement of “coerciveness” issue, as an area of common ground in
clarifying the facts. Additionally, (the Japanese government) will sound out the fact that
it is prepared to hold an interview with a representative (or representatives) of former
comfort women if it is able to obtain the intermediation of the ROK government, as one
part of the package of measures relating to this issue.” In the course of the
working-level discussions, the ROK side stated that on the question of how the Japanese
side makes its recognition, it believed that while it would not be possible to make an
announcement that contradicted the facts for Japan, it should avoid employing a
complicated “preface” (such as stating, for example, that “it was not possible to find
documents showing the direct involvement of the military in the recruitment” before
recognizing the involvement of “coerciveness” in some form).
At the Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on April 1, 1993, Foreign Minister
Watanabe conveyed to Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo that on the issue of
“coerciveness,” “stating that there was involvement of force in all cases would be
difficult,” that “working-level staff are being instructed to explore expressions that
demonstrate the Government of Japan’s recognition to the greatest extent possible but in
a way that does not bring lingering uneasiness to the hearts of citizens of either country”
and that “we hope to consult the ROK side regarding how to present our recognition.”
(8) At the same time, up to then the ROK side had adopted the position that it should not
raise point-by-point questions about how to clarify the facts, and that the bottom line
was that it wanted Japan to move the process ahead in good faith. However, from
around the time of the Foreign Minsters’ Meeting held on April 1, 1993, the ROK side
began adopting a stance that it expected the Japanese side to move ahead with clarifying
the facts in a way that would be convincing to comfort women-related groups within the
ROK, and that the ROK government itself would not be able to exert pressure
domestically in order to try to control the situation. Similarly, at a working-level
9
exchange of views between Japan and the ROK that took place in early April 1993, the
ROK stated that, in response to the approach by the Japanese side, (i) the Japanese side
needs to be visibly seen to have exhausted every effort to clarify the facts and there
should be no unnecessary rush to resolve the issue hurriedly; (ii) it is unlikely to be
acceptable to state that only some comfort women were forced; and (iii) it will not be
possible for the ROK government to direct or otherwise shut out public opinion in the
ROK to try to settle the issue with the Japanese side, and everything will come down to
how the Government of Japan’s stance is received by the citizens of the ROK.
Additionally, in exchanges between working-level staff in Japan and the ROK that
took place in late April 1993, the ROK side stated that if the announcement by the
Japanese side relied on measured expressions such as “there was involvement of
coerciveness in some cases” it would likely trigger a furor. In response, the Japanese
side replied that on the issue of “coerciveness”, based also on the findings of the inquiry
conducted domestically up to then, it would not be possible to arrive at a conclusion that
would distort historical facts. Additionally, following the report on the outcome of this
discussion, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara stated that it would not be possible
to say unconditionally that all comfort women were recruited with “coerciveness.”
(9) When Foreign Minister Muto visited the ROK on June 29 and 30, 1993, the Foreign
Minister said it would “announce our findings based on an objective judgment and
demonstrate our recognition of this issue” and that “with regard to what sort of
expressions will be used specifically, the Japanese side also intends to make the utmost
effort to obtain the understanding of the citizens of the ROK, but in doing so, hopes to
secure the understanding and cooperation of the ROK government from a broader
perspective.” Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo expressed gratitude for the abundantly
sincere statement from the Japanese side, while stating that “the number one priority is
to recognize force, number two is an utmost effort to clarify the overall picture, number
three is an expression of commitment to continuing with the inquiry from here on as
well, and number four is an expression of intention to learn the lessons of history. If
these points are met then”…“the ROK government also”…“intends to strive to
amicably resolve this issue.” The ROK side also explained that it did not intend to seek
monetary compensation from Japan.
4. Details of the Hearings of the Former Comfort Women
(1) Concerning the hearings of the former comfort women, the ROK side indicated
continuously over the period from July to December 1992 the following (i) that there
10
should be hearings of the victims and the perpetrators; (ii) that the Japanese side, while
it might not be able to listen to all of the comfort women, ought to listen to some of
them to demonstrate its sincerity; (iii) the importance that the Government of Japan to
communicate to the ROK people that it was doing its absolute best to address this issue;
(iv) that not only the Government of Japan, but also local governments and foreign
countries should conduct investigations and listen to the testimonies of relevant parties.
Moreover, the ROK side indicated its view that hearings would be able to soften the
feelings of the related parties and would also show Japan’s sincerity to those who were
insisting that it was not of their own will.
(2) Initially the view within the Japanese side was that once the hearing with the
former comfort women began that it would not have control and that it needed to be
cautiously considered. But by December 1992, based on the above-stated views of the
ROK and that, “in the final stage, in which there is the prospect of receiving cooperation
from the ROK on concluding the clarification of facts and follow-up measures,” it
decided on a policy of carrying out a hearing of the former comfort women “in the
minimum necessary format.” Subsequently, in communication between Japan and ROK
officials in March 1993, the Japanese side sounded out the ROK side that, in accordance
with its measures to respond to three of the aforementioned policies (see 3 (4) to (6)), if
the Government of the ROK will be able to mediate, then as part of a package of
measures for this issue, it was ready to hold interviews with a representative (or
representatives) of the former comfort women. In response to this, the ROK side
commented that it was a noteworthy idea and also stated that it might not be necessary
to hear from all of the relevant parties, that it would be possible to request the
attendance of “witnesses,” and that the Government of the ROK would probably prefer
not to witness it.
(3) From around April 1993, communications on the hearings with the former comfort
women took place in earnest. At this time, the Government of the ROK began sounding
out groups related to the comfort women issue, but it explained that the claims of the
groups related to the comfort women issue were harsh against Japan, and that there were
negative reactions that speeding up for a solution were perceived as taking the
testimony of the comfort women but with the intention of avoiding the main issue. Also,
the Government of the ROK stated that it was necessary to explain the status of the
hearings, that the interviews with the persons in question were a method of last resort
after every other method of clarifying the facts had been tried, and rather than taking a
11
sudden, unilateral decision to hold interviews, that it was necessary to take enough time
in dealing with this. On top of this, the Government of the ROK discussed the issue
with the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families (hereinafter referred
to as “the Association of the Bereaved.” Formed in 1973, the objective of the activities
of this incorporated body, which was mainly formed by members of the bereaved
families of the Pacific War, is to investigate the actual conditions of the bereaved
families, to hold mutual exchanges among others) and also the Korean Council for the
Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereinafter referred to as “the
Korean Council.”. Formed in 1990, it is comprised of several Christian women’s groups,
and its policies as a movement are particularly to deal with the comfort women issue, to
certify the crimes of the Japanese army, and to demand legal compensation among
others from the Japanese side). The Government of the ROK indicated that its view was
that the Association of the Bereaved would agree to holding the hearings, but that the
Korean Council had expressed its disapproval for any hearings, hence one proposal was
to refer to the testimonies collected by the Korean Council. In the middle of May 1993,
the Government of the ROK indicated that it did not think any new facts would emerge
from the hearings, but it would respond to it if it were to be held as part of a process to
resolve this issue. Also, in the communication between Japan and ROK officials that
took place at the beginning of July, the ROK side indicated its views that conducting the
hearings ultimately was up to the Japanese side and while it did not consider it to be
indispensable, hearings would be one process that would strongly demonstrate the
sincerity of the Japanese side, and that if it could be realized, it considered that it could
be one effective process in order to receive a positive reaction from the relevant parties
in the ROK when the results of the inquiries were announced.
(4) From the end of May to June 1993, the Japanese side successively made contact and
held discussions with the Korean Council and the Association of the Bereaved toward
holding hearings with the former comfort women.
As was previously stated in (3), the Korean Council had a harsh stance due to the
distrust of the Government of Japan and the Government of the ROK suggested that in
order to mitigate this, carrying out local investigation or having the attendance of
civilians at the interviews were required. Based on the Government of the ROK’s
suggestions, in late May, the Japanese Embassy in the ROK began discussions with the
Korean Council, but for it to agree to the hearings, it attached conditions that the
findings of the additional inquiry conducted by the Government of Japan at that time
should be presented in advance and that the “force” be recognized, and despite
12
communications with the Japanese side, it did not alter this stance. The Korean Council
commented that if Japanese officials, and moreover male officials, suddenly arrived in
the ROK, no one would open their hearts and talk, and it should be sufficient to refer to
the collection of testimonies collected by the Korean Council for the testimony of the
comfort women. Ultimately, hearings with the Korean Council were abandoned and
instead, its collection of testimonies was referred to.
(5) On the other hand, the Japanese Embassy in the ROK began discussions with the
Association of the Bereaved and over the course of negotiations with it that took place
on several occasions, the Association agreed to the holding of hearings. For this, both
agreed (i) that the hearings be held in a quiet environment and that the location be the
office of the Association of the Bereaved; (ii) that when the hearings are held, one
lawyer from the National Federation of Consultative Assemblies of Civil Liberties and
one lawyer involved in the lawsuit would attend as observers from the Japanese side,
while one relevant party from the Association of the Bereaved would attend as an
observer from its side; (iii) that the hearings would take place with all the comfort
women who wished to attend, recruited by the Association of the Bereaved; (iv) that no
outside journalists enter the hearings and in addition, while video would be taken for
use as internal record for the Association of the Bereaved, this video would not be
released nor used in court of law; (v) that the Government of Japan as a defendant in the
lawsuit regarding the comfort women, would not use the testimonies of the nine former
comfort women who are appearing on the plaintiff side as reference in itself,, but
agreed that these testimonies collected in a different format by the Association of the
Bereaved could be used as reference materials. The time for prior coordination for the
hearings was limited and also there was an attitude that for the Japanese side, the stories
of the former comfort women would be difficult to listen to. Hence, as was previously
stated, the hearings were held at a venue arranged by the Association of the Bereaved
(the office of the Association), and the Japanese side would not be involved in the
selection of the former comfort women who would attend the hearing. Furthermore,
during the coordination of specific details between the Japanese side and the
Association of the Bereaved for the holding of the hearings, facts that showed that the
Government of the ROK participated or coordinated in some way in the selection of the
former comfort women who would attend the hearing could not be confirmed.
(6) Finally, the hearings at the office of the Association of the Bereaved began on July
26, 1993. It was initially scheduled for two days until the following day on July 27, but
13
ultimately it was held until July 30 and hearings of a total of 16 people were held. On
the Japanese side, five people attended the hearings from the Cabinet Councilors’ Office
on External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating at the beginning that the
contents of the hearing were not to be publicized. Among the former comfort women,
there were various cases; there were some who spoke indifferently and others whose
memories had become confused. However, the Japanese side maintained from start to
finish an attitude of listening sincerely to what the former comfort women had to say.
From the Government of the ROK, only a member of the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs attended as an observer at the start of the hearings on each day.
(7) Regarding the status of the hearings, rather than a clarification of the facts, the
intention was to show the sincere attitude of the Government of Japan in clarifying the
facts as a process based on the details of the events up to that point by holding the
hearings of the comfort women, and stand by with the former comfort women to deeply
understand their feelings, and hence the results of it were not compared to post-facto
corroborating investigations or other testimonies. The relationship between the hearings
and the Kono Statement that was released immediately after it was that, prior to the
holding of the hearings, the relevant ministries had practically finished compiling the
findings of the additional inquires and they had already prepared the original draft of the
Kono Statement prior to the completion of the hearings (refer to 5 below).
5. Communication on the Wording of the Kono Statement
(1) After the announcement in July 1992 by Chief Secretary Kato, the Japanese side
aimed to release some sort of announcements on its clarification of facts and follow-up
measures, and held detailed discussions with the ROK side. In communication between
Japan and ROK officials in March 1993, the ROK side stated that the Japanese
announcement should not be treated as an outcome of discussions with the ROK, but
ultimately treated as something independently released by the Japanese side, and that its
impression was that it would prefer the content of the announcement to be as close as
possible to the content that would satisfy the ROK. In communication between Japan
and ROK officials in May 1993, the Japanese side stated it wanted to avoid a negative
response by the Government of the ROK to its announcement. Hence, with regards to
the recognition on the involvement of “coerciveness,” the Japanese side stated that,
while not word-for-word, it wanted to communicate with the ROK on this issue. In
response to this, the ROK side stated it would cooperate in various ways and that it
wanted to know the content of the announcement and be notified of the wording of it.
14
In the Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 28, 1993, Foreign Minister
Muto stated, “we want to consult in advance with members of your Government on the
wording of the announcement,” and that “regarding this (comfort women) issue we
want to basically put a full stop to it diplomatically. President Kim Yong-sam stated that
if the Japanese side was completely sincere in its announcement, he considered that he
would explain the announcement to the people of his country, and in this case, it was
possible to obtain the understanding of the people of the ROK could be obtained. Based
on this point, we would definitely want the President to explain the views of Japan.” In
response to this, Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo stated that, “we wish to appreciate the
efforts and the sincerity of Japan regarding this issue. We hope that President Kim
Yong-sam will be able to explain the findings of the inquiry by Japan to the people of
the ROK in a form that will be able to satisfy them. In addition, we expect that through
this, ROK-Japan relations will come to be future-oriented, which is an outcome that the
ROK is also hoping for.”
(2) Meanwhile on the Japanese side, even after the announcement by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kato, the relevant ministries and agencies continuously investigated related
documents and additionally conducted search and investigation of documents in the
United States National Archives and Records Administration and in other locations.
With these documents that were obtained in this way as a basis, it also began to analyze
hearings of military-related parties and those responsible for managing the comfort
stations, as well as testimonies collected by the Korean Council, and was able to
practically finish compiling the report on the study results. The recognition obtained
through these series of studies was that it was not possible to confirm that women were
“forcefully recruited.”
(3) Subsequently, actual coordination on the wording of the statement began between
Japan and the ROK in response to the above-mentioned Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. By
July 29, 1993, at the latest, which was before the end of the hearings of the comfort
women (held July 26 to 30, 1993), the Government of Japan had already prepared the
draft of the statement based on the results of the study of the relevant documents (refer
to 4 (7) above).
The coordination on the wording of the statement took place up until August 3, the
day before the statement was to be announced, between the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the ROK Embassy in Japan, and the Japanese Embassy in the ROK
and the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were conducted intensively and it was
15
confirmed that the initial comments from the ROK were received at the latest by July 31.
In these comments, the ROK stated that while it considered that the content of the
announcement should be independently decided on by the Government of Japan and
that it did not in any way consider it to be an outcome of a negotiation, but in order to
solve this issue, it must be appreciated by the people of the ROK and from this
perspective, it hoped that a part of the statement be amended, and that if the
Government of Japan released the statement without responding to this point, then the
Government of the ROK would not be able to positively respond to it. Subsequently, on
several occasions during the above-described period of coordination on the wording of
the statement, the ROK side provided various comments, including on the issue of
“coerciveness,” on the establishment of the comfort stations, and on the recruitment of
the comfort women. In response, on the Japanese side, the Cabinet Councilors’ Office
on External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to closely cooperate
and share information, and within the limit of not distorting the relevant facts based on
the study that had taken place up until that time, it coordinated with the Government of
the ROK on the wording of the statement with a stance of accepting those intentions and
requests of the Government of the ROK that it could accept, and rejecting those that it
could not accept.
In the coordination with the ROK, the three main points of contention were as
follows: (i) the involvement of the military in the establishment of the comfort stations;
(ii) the involvement of the military in the recruitment of the comfort women; (iii) the
“coerciveness” of the recruitment of the comfort women.
Regarding the involvement of the military in the establishment of the comfort stations,
the expression that the Japanese side offered was that they were the “intention” of the
military authorities, but the ROK requested this expression be changed to “instruction.”
However, the Japanese side could not accept this as it could not confirm that the
military “instructed” the establishment of the comfort stations and proposed instead the
expression of “requested.”
Also, regarding the involvement of the military in the recruitment of the comfort
women, the ROK requested wording that was equivalent to “the military or recruiters
who were instructed by the military,” or in other words, that the recruitment was carried
out by the military or that the military instructed other recruiters to do so. But the
Japanese side considered that the recruitment was not carried out by the military, but
mainly by recruiters who had done so based on the “intentions” of the military, and
hence could not accept that the military were the main party that carried out the
recruitment. Also, as the Japan side could not confirm that the military “instructed” the
16
recruiters to carry out the recruitment, it proposed that the expression be changed to that
the military “requested” the recruiters carry out the recruitment.
In response to this, the ROK wanted the expression “ordered” used for the
involvement of the military in both the establishment of the comfort stations and the
recruitment of the comfort women, but the Japanese side did not accept it. Ultimately, it
was decided on the wording that the comfort stations were established and managed
according to the military authorities’ “request,” and also the recruiters were “requested”
to carry out the recruitment by the military.
Regarding an apology and feelings of remorse, the Japanese side presented a draft
that included “(it) severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The
Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its
sincere apologies.” The ROK side requested the addition of “remorse” to the wording of
this expression of “apology” to which the Japanese side agreed.
In this coordination process, the draft was consulted to as high as Prime Minister
Miyazawa on the Japanese side and President Kim Yong-sam on the ROK side and
acquired their final consent. But the question of how “coerciveness” of the recruitment
of the comfort women would be expressed and worded in the statement constituted the
main issue of contention in the communication with the ROK side.
Even at the stage of August 2, the ROK side stated that, with exceptions on some
main points, the Japanese side made some proposals that could be acceptable for both
sides in view of meeting the expectations of the ROK side, and the differences in the
two sides’ perceptions about the main points were not that large. However, it also added
that there were limits that it could not go beyond, and that the people of the ROK would
not accept any suggestion that some of women became comfort women voluntarily.
Specifically, regarding the phrase in the Japanese side’s draft of “in many cases they
were recruited against their own will (by the recruiters), through coaxing, coercion, etc.”
the ROK side requested the removal of the phrase “in many cases,” but the Japanese
side refused as it was difficult for it to accept that the women were recruited against
their will in every case. Also, coordination took place until the last moment on
“coerciveness” to describe the recruitment of the comfort women on the Korean
Peninsula. Communication continued until the evening of August 2, based on the point
that “The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days,” if seen across the
stages of their “recruitment, transfer, control, etc.,” regardless of how they were
recruited, the sense that this was conducted as a whole against the will of the individuals
was finally coordinated as being expressed as “generally against their will, through
coaxing, coercion, etc.”
17
Finally, on the evening of August 3, the ROK Embassy in Japan notified the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that based on instructions by the home country, President
Kim Yong-sam had appreciated the current (final) draft presented by the Japanese side
and communicated to it that the Government of the ROK accepted the wording of the
draft. At this point, a final agreement was reached on the wording of the Kono
Statement.
(4) As can be referred above in (2), the Japanese side, under the recognition that the so
called “forcefully taking away” of women could not be confirmed based on the studies
including inquiry on relevant documents by relevant ministries and agencies, document
searches at the US National Archives and Records Administration, as well as hearings
of military parties and managers of comfort stations and analysis of testimonies
collected by the Korean Council, dealt with the coordination on the wording of the
Kono Statement with the Korean side with a stance that, within the limits of not
distorting the facts based on the studies, it would accept those intentions and requests of
the Government of the ROK that it could accept, and reject those that it could not
accept.
Regarding such prior communication that was conducted between Japan and the
ROK, on August 2, 1993, the Japanese side stated that it should not be disclosed to the
media, and the ROK side agreed to this. In addition, the ROK side was to say that it had
received the content of the statement by fax from the Japanese side only just before the
announcement. Also, on the release of the statement on August 4, the response
guidelines prepared by Japanese officials included the response line which read that
there had been “no prior consultation” with the ROK side and that the result of the study
was communicated immediately before.”
(5) With such background, on August 4, 1993, the Japanese side announced the
summary of the findings of the study that had taken place up to that time through Chief
Cabinet Secretary Kono, and also released a statement (the Kono Statement).
Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono (4 August 1993)
The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of "wartime comfort
women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.
As a result of the study, which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive
areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort
stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then
18
Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the
comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was
conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The
Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will,
through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took
part in the recruitment. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.
As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding
those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean
Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were
conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.
Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day,
that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like
to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those,
irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and
psychological wounds as comfort women.
It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while
listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and
take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat
the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching
of history.
As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue
outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including
private researched related thereto.
(6) Regarding the recognition of the issue of “coerciveness,” at a press conference held
by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono on the same day, when questioned about whether
Japan had recognized the fact that the women had been forcefully taken away, he stated
that “we accept that to be the case.”
Also, when it was pointed out that the word “coercion” was not used in the context of
the recruitment of the comfort women but in the description of their lives at the comfort
stations, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono stated, “the Statement states that “(they) were
recruited by coaxing and coercion against their will.” One can understand the meaning
of being recruited against their will.”
Further, when asked was there not any descriptions found in official documents that
supported the notion that they were transported coercively, Chief Cabinet Secretary
19
Kono stated, “within the term “coercion,” there are physical coercion and psychological
coercion”, and “many instances (of psychological coercion) would not have been
recorded in administrative/military records,” but “there had been sufficient
investigations on whether or not there were such cases or not,” including hearings or
collection of testimonies of former wartime comfort women and hearing from former
managers of comfort stations, and from these sources “it is clear after the studies that in
many cases the women were transported against their will as stated here (in the
Statement)” “and that they lived after being recruited in a condition where their wills
were deprived.
(7) After the release of the Kono Statement, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
released its assessment of the statement, stating that it appreciated that “the Government
of Japan, through this announcement, recognizes the overall involvement of force in the
recruitment, transportation, and administration of the comfort women for Japanese
troops, and in addition to apologizing to the victims, and expressing its remorse for its
actions, it expresses its resolve to view this squarely as a lesson of history.” At the same
time the Japanese Embassy in the ROK pointed out to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that the ROK press was reporting the facts without attachment, and there were a
lot of rather positive responses of it, and that the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
been actively cooperating. It also reported that the background to this was that, in
addition to the sincerity of the Japanese side in terms of the result of its study and the
statement, consultations had been frequently held with the Government of the ROK
regarding the handling of this issue, and the Japanese side had frankly communicated its
thoughts and also, to the greatest possible extent, had incorporated the comments of the
ROK side.
(8) With the release of the Kono Statement, more detailed discussions were held
between the two countries regarding the best way to implement “measures” for the
former comfort women by the Japanese side, which was communicated in various ways
with the ROK side (refer to the next section).
20
Ⅱ．Details of the activities of the “National Fund for Asian Peace and Women”
(subsequently, “the Fund”) in the ROK
1. Up to the Establishment of the Fund (1993 to 1994)
(1) As is described in the previous section, in the communication between the
Governments of Japan and ROK on the comfort women issue, the clarifying of facts and
follow-up measures were perceived to be a package. In the Kono Statement of August 4,
1993, Japan stated that “…while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we
can express this sentiment (of apology and remorse). We shall face squarely the
historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as
lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same
mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and
teaching of history.” Japan confirmed the views of the Government of the ROK on what
sorts of “measures” it ought to take for the former comfort women, and the ROK side
responded that its understanding was that as settlement had already been reached for the
issue of the legal compensation from Japan to the ROK, therefore if some other
measures were to be taken, rather than being legal compensation, they should officially
be unilateral measures taken by the Japanese side, and that they should not be of a
nature that the Korean side would meddle.
(2) Subsequently, the Governments of Japan and the ROK repeatedly communicated on
the specific measures to be taken for the former comfort women, but whatever specific
measures the Government of Japan implemented, the problems concerning properties
and claims between the two countries and their nationals, which includes the comfort
women issue, had in legal terms already been settled completely and finally. Therefore,
it was confirmed to the ROK side that Japan expected that no measures would be
carried out to compensate individuals among the former comfort women in the ROK.
The ROK side considered this issue to be dealt by the Japanese side on its own as part
of its coming into terms with its post-war issues, and also responded that it would not
request any material compensation from the Government of Japan and that it would not
be involved in measures taken by the Japanese side. Furthermore, during the summer of
the following year of 1994, in the communication between officials of Japan and the
ROK, the ROK side frankly explained that if felt that that within the ROK, there are
views expressed by the victims and the related groups, and that while on the one hand is
a popular opinion that demands compensation, while the other popular opinion is that
whether it be comfort women issue are not, demands against the Government of Japan
21
should end sooner or later, and in terms of numbers, the latter opinion were probably in
the majority.
(3) On December 7, 1994, the “First Report” was issued by the Subcommittee to
Address the Wartime Comfort Women Issue, which was established under the “Ruling
Parties’ Project to Deal with Issues Fifty Years After the War set up by the three ruling
parties (the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and New Party
Sakigake). The report stated that, along with the establishment of a citizen-participation
type fund and measures to be implemented for the former comfort women, in order that
the mistakes of the past not be repeated, it would assist in activities that educate, prevent,
and resolve current issues relating to the honor and dignity of women, such as violence
against women and that the Government would cooperate to its full extent with the
Fund, including through financial contribution.
(4) On June 13, 1995, the Government of Japan reported in advance to the ROK side on
its decision to officially announce the Fund the following day, intended for those former
comfort women in the ROK, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Netherlands.
The objective in establishing it and the basic characteristics of its operations were
described in the “Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi on the
Establishment of the Asian Fund for Women.” The Government of the ROK stated that
(i) as a general impression, even if it would not satisfy the relevant parties, the
Government of the ROK felt that it could be positively appreciated on several points;
(ii) President Kim Yong-sam has continued to address that compensation for the comfort
women is not necessary, but also clearly indicated that there should be a far reaching
fact-finding on this issue; (iii) the points that the ROK side had requested, that it include
an official attribute of being implemented by the Government of Japan and that it
express feelings of apology from the Government of Japan, where generally included in
it, and hence the ROK could respond positively on these points. At the same time, it
responded that the Government of the ROK wanted to cooperate as much as possible to
explain Japan’s efforts to the relevant groups. On the following day, June 14, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Igarashi released the following statement.
Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi on the Establishment of the Asian Fund
for Women (14 June 1995)
To follow up the statement made in August, 1994, by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama,
and in accordance with discussions of the Ruling Parties' Project Team for 50th Anniversary Issues,
22
and after consideration within the Government, based on our remorse for the past on the occasion
of the 50th anniversary of the end of the War, the projects of the "Asian Peace and Friendship Fund
for Women" will be undertaken as follows.
1. The following activities will be conducted for the former wartime comfort women, through the
cooperation of the Japanese People and the Government:
(a) The Fund will raise funds in the private sector as a means to enact the Japanese people's
atonement for former wartime comfort women.
(b) The Fund will support those conducting medical and welfare projects and other similar projects
which are of service to former wartime comfort women, through the use of government funding
and other funds.
(c) When these projects are implemented, the Government will express the nation's feelings of
sincere remorse and apology to the former wartime comfort women.
(d) In addition, the Government will collate historical documents on past wartime comfort women,
to serve as a lesson of history.
2. As its project addressing issues related to the honor and dignity of women, including the projects
mentioned in 1 (b) above, the Fund will, through the use of government funding and other funds,
support those who undertake projects that address contemporary problems, such as violence
against women.
3. The names of those who have given their support to date, acting as "proponents" calling on a
broad range of Japanese people to cooperate with the projects of the "Asian Peace and Friendship
Fund for Women," are listed separately.
Responding to the above, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the following
Ministry of Foreign Affairs comment.
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs comment regarding the announcement by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kozo Igarashi (June, 1995)
1．The Government of the ROK considers that, regarding the follow-up to the wartime comfort
women issue, fundamentally the outcome of the fact-finding investigation was a matter
independently decide upon by the Government of Japan, but that in order to facilitate a resolution to
the wartime comfort women issue, we have been pointing to the need to reflect the items required by
the relevant parties to the greatest possible extent.
2．The current establishment of the Fund by the Government of Japan is tempered with an official
23
attribute of being partially funded from the Government’s budget, and also when the Fund’s
operations are carried out in the future, on the points that it clearly includes an expression of sincere
remorse and apology as a nation to the relevant parties, a fact-finding of the past, and that this
problem be considered as a lesson to be learned from history, we appreciate it to be a sincere
measure that to a certain extent reflects the requirements of the relevant parties up to this time.
3．The Government of the ROK hopes that going forward, with the opportunity provided by this
establishment of the Fund by Japan, the historical facts within the various problems in our countries’
pasts will be clarified and by striving positively in order to resolve them, the relations between our
two neighboring countries will develop to be future-oriented, friendly relations based on the correct
recognition of history.
2. The Initial Period after the Establishment of the Fund (1995 to 1996)
(1) Conversely, the victim support groups in the ROK labeled the Fund as “payment for
services” from private-sector organizations, and criticized the approach of the
Government of Japan and the Fund. Based on this response, although the Government
of the ROK released a statement in July 1995 which the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs expressed its appreciation on the announcement by the Chief Cabinet
Secretary, it addressed its position that the victim support groups strongly opposed the
ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which put the ROK side in a difficult position,
making it hard to openly cooperate with the Japanese Government under the current
circumstances but wanting to cooperate with the Japanese Government
behind-the-scenes.
(2) In July 1996, the Fund decided to provide the former comfort women with
“atonement money” and “a letter of apology” from the Prime Minister, and also to carry
out medical and welfare projects. With regards to the “letter of apology” from the Prime
Minister, the Government of the ROK pointed out while there was an apology from the
Government of Japan to the Government of the ROK, but the reaction of the victims
was that they felt it was not an apology to them individually. Therefore Japan decided it
to be the form of a letter by the Prime Minister as expressing an apology. In order for
the Government of Japan to explain this decision to the ROK side, it asked for talks
with the Association of the Bereaved and the Korean Council via the Government of the
ROK, but both organizations indicated their view that they were not able to accept the
provision of the “private-sector funds.”
24
(3) From the Government of the ROK side, it addressed its wishes that (i) whatever
form the Japanese Government would take needs to satisfy the victims (ii) after Japan
declares that it would be impossible to provide state compensation to the victims in
legal terms, whether it could address its feelings of apology from the government, and
in any way make it seem like as if it is a state compensation, and (iii) whether the
Government of Japan could issue a message on the lines of, “We want to hold sincere
discussions in the future with regards to our relationship with the ROK,” and it
expressed its intentions of hoping to take some time and discuss quietly with the
Japanese side on what the subsequent, specific measures Japan will take.
(4) The Fund’s projects began in the Philippines in August of the same year, and in the
same month, the Fund, under a policy of implementing projects to the victims that had
received the recognition from the Government of the ROK, sent a Team for Dialogue
comprised of members of the Fund Advisory Committee to the ROK to meet with and
explain the project to ten of the victims. Then in December of the same year, seven of
the former comfort women announced that they would accept the efforts of the Fund
and would be recipients of its project.
3. Implementing Projects for Seven Former Comfort Women (January 1997)
(1) On the implementation of projects for the seven women described above, on
January 10, 1997 (the day prior to the launch of the project), the Government of Japan
reported in advance to the ROK Embassy in Japan that the Fund seemed to have
decided to implement the projects to the former comfort women who had expressed
their willingness to receive it. The Government of the ROK responded that (i) there will
be no solution unless the project was provided in a form that would satisfy both the
related groups and the victims, and (ii) if the project was only implemented to some of
the former comfort women, it is likely that the related groups will react harshly to it,
and as it was immediately prior to the Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and
Summit, it considered the timing to be bad.
(2) On the following day, January 11, a group representing the Fund visited the seven
former comfort women in Seoul and delivered “a letter of apology” from the Prime
Minister, clarifying to the ROK media the facts of the project, and also explaining the
Fund itself.
25
Letter from the Prime Minister to the Former Comfort Women
Dear Madam,
On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the Government and the
people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the former wartime comfort women, I
wish to express my feelings as well.
The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time,
was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women. As Prime Minister of
Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent
immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as
comfort women.
We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future.
I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and
remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.
Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and other forms of
injustice to the honor and dignity of women. Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of
you will find peace for the rest of your lives.
Respectfully yours,
Prime Minister of Japan
(Prime Ministers who signed the letter are: Ryutaro Hashimoto, Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and
Junichiro Koizumi)
In response to this, the ROK media criticized the Fund’s activities and the victim
support groups began harassing the seven former comfort women, and also other
comfort women seeking to newly apply for the Fund. The victim support group
publically mentioned the real names of the seven former comfort women and in addition,
telephoned them and criticized them for receiving money from a “private-sector fund,”
saying that by doing so, they voluntarily recognized themselves to be “prostitutes.”
Subsequently, parties related to the groups even visited the homes of the former comfort
women who had newly declared that they would accept projects from the Fund in order
to press them not to accept any “dirty money from Japan.”
(3) Also, immediately afterwards, the Government of the ROK stated its regrets and
added that it considered it natural that they should receive records from the Fund on to
whom it was handing out the projects, and that the Japanese side perhaps were a little
impatient in doing so, and that the ROK was really perplexed about the Fund’s activities
26
in the ROK.
(4) The following week during the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of Japan and the ROK,
ROK’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoo Chong-ha commented that it was extremely
regrettable that the Fund had started projects the previous weekend and that money was
being given to the former comfort women, and demanded the withdrawal of the project
and the temporary suspension of payments in the future. Also, during the courtesy call
of Japan’s Foreign Minister Ikeda to President Kim Yong-san, the President said that
this was a sensitive issue when viewed from the perspective of the feelings of the ROK
people, and that while it had been reported to him that this issue had been discussed at
the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, he felt that the recent measures taken by the Fund has a
strongly detrimental impact on public sentiment in the ROK which was regrettable, and
that he hoped that the measures would not be taken again in the future.
4. The Temporary Suspension of the Fund (February 1997 to January 1998)
(1) Based on the fact that in the ROK, the seven former comfort women who had
received the project from the Fund were being subject to continual harassment, the Fund
decided to temporarily postpone the project and adopt a more cautious approach. On the
other hand, some of the victim support groups reacted positively to coordinating with
the former comfort women who wanted to receive the project from the Fund, and as the
number of former comfort women who wanted to receive the project increased, the
Fund investigated various ways in order to gain the understanding of the ROK in order
to continue the projects; for example, it explored the possibility of placing newspaper
advertisements in the ROK.
(2) Subsequently, between the summer and fall of 1997, discussions were held on
several occasions between the Government of Japan and parties related to the Fund
about placing advertisements in the ROK and on restarting the projects. The
Government of Japan lobbied the Fund to postpone the restarting of the project because
of the upcoming presidential election in the ROK, and also because of the fisheries
negotiations taking place between Japan and the ROK, while the Fund itself, while not
changing its standpoint that it was unconvinced by the Government’s stance, did take
into account the sensitive situation that existed between Japan and the ROK and within
ROK, and agreed to postpone placing newspaper advertisements on several occasions.
27
(3) However, based on the extremely strong desire of the Fund to let as many Korean
former comfort women be informed about the Fund’s activities and its desire to gain
their understanding, and as newspaper companies in the ROK had agreed to publish the
advertisement, the Government of Japan judged that if it were done after the presidential
election on December 18, 1998, and also if it were done in a quiet and discreet manner,
then it had no choice but to agree that advertisements be placed; this decision was
approved by Foreign Minister Obuchi.
5. The Fund Places Advertisements in Newspapers (January 1998)
(1) At the beginning of January 1998, in the communication between the officials of
Japan and the ROK, the Japanese side explained in advance that the Fund intended to
place newspaper advertisements (in four newspapers) with the objective of fostering
understanding of the Fund’s activities within the ROK. The Government of the ROK
responded that unilateral measures taken by the Fund will not resolve the issue and
suggested that a dialogue take place between the Korean Council and the Fund, and that
it would need a little more time in order to bring together the various opinions within
the Korean Council.
(2) On January 6, 1998, following the actual publication of the advertisements, the
Government of the ROK responded that it would prefer that the Japanese side
demonstrated flexibility, that it did not hurry, and deal with this issue in such a way that
it would disappear gradually without being too conspicuous, and that it felt the recent
newspaper advertisements were extremely provocative.
6. The Temporary Suspension of Payments of Atonement Money through the Fund
(February 1998 to February 1999)
(1) In March 1998, the Kim Dae-jung administration was inaugurated and the
Government of the ROK decided to provide “life-support fund” to the former comfort
women instead of demanding state compensation from the Government of Japan. The
Government of the ROK decided that the former comfort women who had already
received money from the Fund would not be eligible for the life-support fund, but
explained that such policy is not intended to openly object the Fund nor a measure to
criticize its activities.
(2) Furthermore, during this period, the Government of the ROK stated that President
Kim Dae-jung himself wanted any financial issues to be sorted out and was of the
28
opinion that it should not become an issue between the two governments. Furthermore,
the ROK stated with feelings of sympathy towards the Fund, that it would be better for
this issue of the Fund be put to an end so that it would not become an issue between the
two governments.
7. Conversion to Medical and Welfare Projects by the Korean Red Cross (March
1999-July 1999)
(1) With the Fund’s medical and welfare projects in the Netherlands commencing
smoothly in July 1998, the Fund began to consider converting its provision of
“atonement money” to medical and treatment projects instead. At the end of January
1999, the Fund decided to inquire to the KRC for its cooperation. In the communication
between officials from Japan and the ROK, the ROK side shared the view to the
fundamental changes to the Fund’s activities, and indicated that it would be appropriate
for the ROK government to positively encourage the KRC once the discussions between
the Japanese side and the KRC makes progress.
(2) However, during the communication between officials of Japan and the ROK at the
end of March 1999, the Government of the ROK suddenly changed its policy. It
indicated that whatever effort was done or not done on this issue, there was going to be
criticism and that a calmer approach was necessary, and because the KRC was
considered to be affiliated with the Government of the ROK, strong opposition could be
expected and hence it wanted to scrap this proposal. In response to this, the Japanese
side protested that this proposal was made from the perspective that it would not have
an adverse effect on the future-oriented Japan-ROK relationship that were cultivated by
the visit of President Kim Dae-jung to Japan, and it obtained the Prime Minister’s
approval upon convincing the Fund that showed strong disapproval to end its original
project, and therefore, it was difficult to understand the suggestions by the ROK. At the
end, because it could not gain the understanding of the ROK side, the conversion of the
project could not be realized.
8. The Suspension of the Fund with Difficulties of Converting the Project (July 1999 to
May 2002)
(1) The Fund was unable to convert its project to medical and welfare projects and in
July 1999, its activities were suspended. This state of suspension continued until
February 2002, but on February 20, the Fund lifted suspension and decided to set a
deadline for project applications within the ROK of May 1 of the same year.
29
(2) In communication between officials of Japan and the ROK in April 2002, the
Government of the ROK once again expressed its opposition to the Fund’s provision of
“atonement money” and to its medical and welfare projects. On May 1, acceptance of
project applications in the ROK ended and the Fund’s activities in ROK that had started
in January 1997 drew to a close.
9. The Results of the Fund’s Activities in the ROK
(1) The Fund, which was established in 1995, raised funds of approximately 600 million
yen, and by the end of March 2007 when the whole project ended with the completion
of the projects in Indonesia, the Government of Japan provided approximately 4.8
billion yen either in the form of contributions or subsidies. In terms of the Fund’s
activities in the ROK, “atonement money” of 2 million yen, the source of which was
donations from the private sector, and 3 million yen for medical and welfare projects,
the source of which was government contributions (for a total of 5 million yen per
person), were provided to a total of 61 former comfort women in the ROK up to the end
of the Fund’s activities, and in addition, all the comfort women that received
“atonement money” also received a letter of apology signed by the Prime Minister at
that time. The breakdown of those who received the Prime Minister’s letter was 27
during the Hashimoto administration, 24 during the Obuchi administration, one during
the Mori administration and nine during the Koizumi administration.
(2) The Fund projects in the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Netherlands were
implemented with the understanding and positive reception by the government and
related groups of the respective country. But in the ROK, it was greatly affected by the
domestic situation within the ROK as well as the bilateral relationship between Japan
and the ROK, and the Fund was not able to gain the understanding of the Government
of the ROK or its people on its activities. However, from the former comfort women in
ROK there were words of gratitude; one former comfort women said that she never
thought that during her lifetime she would receive apologies from the Prime Minister
and money, and that she came to fully understand the feelings of good will of the
Japanese people and wanted to thank them very much.
(3) Furthermore, another person needed money in order to have medical operations
and decided to accept the “atonement money” by the Fund. At first, she did not want to
meet a Fund representative, but when the representative read the Prime Minister’s letter
30

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著者は、北朝鮮の北の国境の、さらに北の中国の東北部（＝旧満州）出身の、元朝鮮系中国人である。
朝鮮人は３８度線の南北に対立存在しているばかりでない。北は、中国領内にも大勢住んでいる。
むかし、日本が朝鮮を併合したときに、当時の中国＝清国と国境を狭く協定した名残なのだそうだ。
参考までに、同様の、中国東北部出身の、元朝鮮族中国人で来日した人物に
金文学がいる。

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引用にあたって、全文をコピーしたのは、この書物の日本語訳が、一般に発刊されておらないためであって、やむなく長々と記載することとなった。

販売されても、いまの若い日本人には、こじつけ理屈にうんざりで読まないであろうから、販売されないのだろう。

共産主義批判の書物が、共産党流の、重苦しい用語で記述されている。

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以上
勝手　引用しました。

http://jp.ntdtv.com/news/2207/九評共産党+【第九評】中国共産党の無頼の本性

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以上
勝手　引用です。

http://www.epochtimes.jp/editorial/9ping-8.html共産党の邪教的本質">九評共産党+【第八評】中国共産党の邪教的本質

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以上
勝手　引用です。

http://www.epochtimes.jp/editorial/9ping-7.html

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以上

勝手　引用です。

http://jp.ntdtv.com/news/2204/九評共産党+【第六評】中国共産党による民族文化の破壊#sthash.JAzGmJxi.dpuf

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以上
勝手　引用です。

hyyp://jp.ntdtv.com/news/2197/九評共産党+【第五評】法輪功への迫害における江沢民と中国共産党の相互利用#sthash.yku2DrDD.dpuf